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Retroactive Relief in the Federal
Courts Since Edelman v.
Jordan: A Trip Through
The Twilight Zone
Norman B. Lichtenstein*
In 1974, the Supreme Court held in Edelman v. Jordan that the eleventh amend-
ment barsfederal courts from awarding retroactive relief against state officials who
have violatedfederal law. Thus Edelman limitsfederal courts to prospective injunc-
tive relief while barring retroactive restoration of unlawfully withheldpublic benfts.
This Article will review the eleventh amendment's history, the rationales behind the
Edelman rule, and theproblems arising with the rule's application. The Article will
then discuss legal developments since the Edelman decision. The author concludes
that the decision has unnecessarily extended the eleventh amendment bar, thereby
restricting the equitablepowers offederal courts and limiting deserving litigantsfrom
receiving the full relief to which they are entitled
INTRODUCTION
As in most areas of the law, the difterence between the type of
relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted
under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between
day and night. 1
IN 1974, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Edelman v.
Jordan2 that the eleventh amendment3 bars federal courts from
awarding retroactive relief against state officials who have vio-
lated federal law.4 The Court reasoned that retroactive restora-
* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Rutgers University (1956); J.D., Yale
University (1959). I wish to thank my colleague, Professor Donald Zeigler, for his percep-
tive comments and kind encouragement, and the students who have acted as research as-
sistants throughout the preparation of this paper-Allen Fine, Paul Polidoro, Anthony
Piscionore, and Charles Ippolito. I also wish to thank the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Chicago for their courtesy in supplying data concerning the Edelman litigation.
1. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974).
2. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (pointing to the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
4. 415 U.S. at 657-59. Five years later in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), a
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tion of wrongfully withheld government benefits amounted to an
award of money damages against the state since the benefits
would come from the state treasury.' Thus, despite the normal,
equitable considerations favoring court-ordered, retroactive cor-
rection of unlawful state procedures by restitution, Edelman lim-
ited the federal courts to providing only prospective relief
mandating changes in state procedures.
Edelman involved a claim for welfare benefits, but its effect
has extended beyond welfare litigation to such areas as public
school education,7 handicapped services,' tuition charges, 9 schol-
arship assistance,10 employment discrimination," tuition assist-
ance, t2  unemployment benefits,' 3  medicaid reimbursement, 14
vocational rehabilitation,15 condemnation,16 zoning, 7 relocation
assistance,'8 and railway freight charges. 19 As a result, not only
may needy welfare recipients and other deserving litigants be de-
prived of benefits to which they are entitled, but state officials may
stand to benefit from violating federal law.2 °
The thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court unnecessa-
rily interfered with the discretion of federal judges to provide res-
titution for official misconduct through a misapplication of the
eleventh amendment. 2 ' This Article will review briefly the history
of the eleventh amendment and its impact on equitable remedies
sequel to Edelman, the Court reaffirmed its position respecting the 1 th amendment. For a
discussion of Quern, see infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
5. 415 U.S. at 664-68.
6. See the Appendix to this Article, infra 397-418, which includes a compilation of
cases denying retroactive relief based upon the Edelman decision. Also included are cases
in which Edelman was distinguished and benefits were awarded.
7. See Meiner v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982).
8. See M.R. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schools, 495 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
9. See Riley v. Ambach, 508 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'don other grounds,
668 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1981).
10. See Mauclet v. Nyquist, 406 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), a f'd on other
grounds, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
11. See Crutcher v. Kentucky, 495 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
12. See Mauclet v. Nyquist, 406 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
13. See Drumright v. Padzieski, 436 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
14. See Shashoua v. Quern, 612 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. See Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 504 F. Supp. 1244 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
16. See Nasralah v. Barcelo, 465 F. Supp. 1273 (D.P.R. 1979).
17. See Ligon v. Maryland, 448 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1977).
18. See Tullock v. State Highway Comm'n, 507 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1974).
19. See Burlington N., Inc. v. North Dakota, 460 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.D. 1978).
20. See 415 U.S. at 692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
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in federal courts.22 Next, the holdings of Edelman and Quern v.
Jordan23 will be dissected.24 Finally, this Article will examine the
lower federal courts' struggles with the Edelman rule,25 develop-
ments in the law since Edelman,26 and will discuss approaches
which may be available to federal court litigants seeking retroac-
tive relief.27
Edelman created a number of troublesome issues regarding the
remedial powers of federal courts. This Article will explore the
development of these issues and their implications in cases subse-
quent to the Edelman decision.
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES:
A BRIEF HISTORY
The eleventh amendment, adopted in 1798, was a reaction to
an early Supreme Court decision allowing a suit against the State
of Georgia.28 Congress feared that this decision would open the
floodgates to a wave of litigation seeking to recover Revolutionary
War debts. Despite the plain meaning of the amendment's lan-
guage, the Supreme Court has long held that the amendment's
prohibition of suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another State"29 also barred actions by
citizens of the same state.3 °
22. See infra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
23. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
24. See infra notes 44-103 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 104-209 and accompanying text.
26. The following student commentaries appeared shortly after the decision in
Edelman: Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 496 (1975); Comment, Edelman v. Jordan: The Case ofthe Vanishing
Retroactive Beneft and the Reappearing Defense of Sovereign Immunity, 12 Hous. L. REv.
891 (1975); Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and Retroactive Welfare Benefits, 36 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 78 (1974);
27. See infra notes 181-95 & 206-09 and accompanying text.
28. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). For discussions of the historical
basis of the 11 th amendment, see Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U.
COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: (A Case of
the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REv. I (1967); Field, The Eleventh Amend-
ment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977);
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976). For an
overview of the 11 th amendment and a somewhat different view regarding the reasons for
its enactment, see C. JACOBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1972).
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251
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Ex parte Young,"' however, decided in 1908, narrowed the
amendment by holding that a federal court suit, seeking to enjoin
a state official from committing unconstitutional acts, was not a
suit against the state.32 Rather, the suit was one against a state
official in his individual capacity who, by acting in an unlawful
manner, was stripped of the authority and imprimatur of the
state.3 3 Furthermore, the state's necessary expenditure of money
U.S. 311, 313 (1920); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 524 (1899); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 10-17 (1890).
Hans is the primary authority for the notion that citizens of the defendant state are
included in the prohibitions of the 11th amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63. See also
Cullison, supra note 28, at 22-24 (discussion of Hans). In Hans, a bondholder brought suit
to compel payment on coupons which the state of Louisiana had dishonored. He argued
that the state's action impaired a contract in violation of Article I, section 10 of the United
States Constitution. The Court recognized that the 11th amendment, by its own wording,
did not apply to citizens of Louisiana, but stated that it would be "anomalous" if citizens of
the same state could sue that state in federal court, while citizens of another or foreign state
could not. 134 U.S. at 10-Il. According to the Court, Congress could not have intended
such a loophole. Id. at 15. It has been suggested that political and economic reasons per-
taining to the Reconstruction period were responsible for the Hans decision. See Orth, The
Eleventh Amendment and the North Carolina State Debt, 59 N.C.L. REV. 747 (1981). While
the decision in Hans may appear to rest on shaky grounds-it has been followed continu-
ally by the courts since that time. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63.
31. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
32. Id. at 159. In Young, railroad stockholders sought to enjoin the state of Minnesota
from implementing maximum interstate railroad rates on the theory that the rates and the
civil and criminal penalties imposed for failing to comply with rate schedules constituted a
deprivation of due process. Id. at 129-30. Young, the state attorney general, ignored a
federal court injunction and sought to enforce the rate structure in state court. Id. at
133-34. He was subsequently found in contempt and arrested by a United States marshall.
Id. at 126. Young petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States Supreme
Court. He argued that the 11th amendment was a barrier to the federal court's exercise of
jurisdiction. Id. at 136-38.
33. Id. at 159-60. The Court stated:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the
Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into
conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to
him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States.
Id. Thus, the conduct of a state official constitutes state action governed by 14th amend-
ment standards, but the very same conduct does not constitute state action to which the
l1th amendment applies and injunction may issue. Despite the criticism directed toward
its reasoning, the significance of Young is clear.
With all its tortured reasoning, Young is one of the pillars of the American
legal system, "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government
and the rule of law." If the eleventh amendment had succeeded in thwarting all
federal court litigation against states and their officers, the importance of the in-
ferior federal courts would have been seriously diminished. More to the point, if
Exparte Young had been decided otherwise, freedom itself would have suffered a
terrible blow, for federal courts are the "primary and dominant instruments for
vindicating rights given by the Constitution."
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from the state treasury to comply with the injunction did not of-
fend the eleventh amendment. 34  Thus, the equitable powers of
the federal courts could be applied to reach a result which would
otherwise be unconstitutional. One commentator noted:
Exparte Young crystalized the role of the federal courts. By
legerdemain, it solved a constitutional.riddle, how the eleventh
and fourteenth amendments can coexist. The solution was Pro-
crustean, dwarfing the eleventh. No more would the states at-
tend the federal courts at their leisure. Now the states could be
hauled there pseudonymously in the name of their hired hands,
their own officialdom, high and low. Exparle Young marks the
conversion of the federal courts to guardians against state in-
cursions, errant or marauding.35
The conceptual fiction of Exparle Young has enabled the fed-
eral courts to entertain actions against state officials in various
types of section 198336 civil rights actions, including public benefit
cases. 37 Exparte Young, however, did not indicate whether a fed-
eral court may award monetary benefits improperly denied by the
state before the court's injunction.38 This issue is critical since ret-
Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and The First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 740, 764 (1974) (quoting Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 509 (1928)).
34. 415 U.S. at 667-68. Accord Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977):
"[Flederal courts [may] enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of
federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury."
35. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 776-77.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
37. It is noteworthy that in the last eight years over 75,000 federal civil rights actions
were filed in the federal courts. These included 1,592 cases in the welfare area. See AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS (1980) table 28, at 70. Moreover, the filing of such actions was facilitated
in 1980 when Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to eliminate the $10,000 amount in
controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, 2369. The amended section states: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." Id. The $10,000 requirement was retained only for claims arising
under the Consumer Product Safety Act. Id. § 2(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2072).
For a comprehensive discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (enacted as the Civil Rights Act of
187 1) and its significance as "an enforcement mechanism of the fourteenth amendment to
protect the citizenry from the unconstitutional actions of the States," see Thompson v. New
York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Baker, supra note 28, at 157-58;
Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293, 331-34
(1980).
38. The Court in Young, 209 U.S. at 167, cited with approval Osborn v. United States
Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), a case involving an illegal state levy against a feder-
ally chartered bank. In Osborn, the court stated:
The true inquiry is, whether an injunction can be issued to restrain a person, who
is a State officer, from performing any official act enjoined by statute; and
whether a Court of equity can decree restitution, if the act be performed. In pre-
[Vol. 32:364
PETR04ACTIVE RELIEF
roactive awards are essential for full equitable relief. They at-
tempt to make whole those wronged by the illegal conduct of state
officials.39
Before Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts frequently, though
not uniformly, awarded retroactive benefits in welfare cases,
4 0
sometimes with summary affirmance by the Supreme Court.41 In
Edelman, the majority recognized the "precedential value" of the
Court's recent afflirmances, but stated that stare decisis was less
constraining in areas of constitutional law than in other areas.42
Since this was the first time the court had had an opportunity to
"fully explore" the eleventh amendment issue with the benefit of
briefing and argument, it was free to reach a different result.43
serving this inquiry, it must be assumed... that the act is unconstitutional, and
furnishes no authority or protection to the officer who is about to proceed under
it.
Id. at 838. Both injunctive relief and restitution were found appropriate in Osborn, with no
distinction made between the two. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 867-71.
39. The need for retroactive relief arises in various federal court claims against state
officials. For examples of such claims, see supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text. See
also Appendix infra pp. 397-418 (catalog of cases claiming retroactive relief). In public
benefits litigation, the court's inability to provide full relief may affect the interests of a
large class of persons. For instance, there were close to 20,000 persons affected in Edelman.
See infra note 73 and accompanying text. Moreover, the court noted in Nelson v. Likens,
389 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Minn. 1974), aft'd, 510 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975):
This Court finds that in this particular situation the loss of money to these
AFDC families is immediate and irreparable harm. While the loss of money is
not considered irreparable, this Court must point out that in this case those af-
fected are not the average citizens but rather those who are in the grip of poverty.
The loss to them of a certain sum of money each month is much more of an injury
than it is to the average individual.
Id. at 1237.
40. See, e.g., Sterret v. Gaither, 409 U.S. 1070, a.f'g 346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind.
1972); State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Zarante, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), afl'g
347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), a 'g 304 F.
Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). In some instances, benefits were denied on 11th amendment
grounds. See, e.g., Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
921 (1973); Frye v. Lukehard, 364 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Va. 1973); Westberry v. Fisher, 309
F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970). In Rothstein, the Second Circuit's position was diametrically
opposed to the Seventh Circuit's position in Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir.
1973). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Edelman v. Jordan (Jordan v. Weaver
below) to resolve this conflict between the circuits.
41. See supra note 40.
42. 415 U.S. at 671. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion.
43. Id. One can only speculate on why there was little litigation in this area before the
late 1960's and why the Supreme Court did not write a decision specifically addressing the
issue of retroactive relief before 1974. This may have been due to the increased use of the
federal courts as forums to protect individuals and groups against state action during the
1960's and 1970's. The federal government did not become involved in providing lawyers
for the poor until the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. As a result of this
legislation, there was an infusion of new lawyers who were prepared to represent low in-
come persons in their conflicts with state officials. See M. GIRTH, POOR PEOPLE'S LAw-
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II. EDELMAN V JORDAN AND QUERN V JORDAN
A. The Opinions
In Edelman, plaintiff recipients of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and
Disabled (AABD) benefits claimed that certain procedures fol-
lowed by the Illinois Department of Public Aid confficted with
federal regulations and violated the fourteenth amendment. "
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that there were lengthy delays in ap-
proving applications and paying assistance monies which caused
considerable hardship to eligible recipients in Illinois.4 5 Plaintiffs
also claimed that defendants had acted illegally by authorizing
grants to begin during the month in which approved, excluding
payments for prior months during which recipients were eligible.4 6
The District Court found that the Illinois procedures confficted
with federal regulations, enjoined their operation, and awarded
back benefits wrongfully withheld by the state. 7
Relying on prior Supreme Court summary affirmances, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Exparte Young was not
limited to prospective relief, but encompassed the broad applica-
tion of the court's remedial powers.4 Accordingly, in order to
provide full relief from the illegal conduct of defendant state offi-
cials, the court approved retroactive relief for benefits wrongfully
YERS (1976). In 1970, the Deputy General Counsel of Health, Education, and Welfare
wrote:
Three years ago it could be said that the federal courts played virtually no role
in shaping the rules which determine whether an individual is eligible for public
assistance under federally financed programs. The intervening period has seen a
dramatic change.
Barrett, The New Role of the Courts in Developing Public Welfare Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1, 1
(1970).
Barrett notes that "until January 1967 the federal courts had finally adjudicated but one
action on welfare grants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... " Id. Barrett attributes the increase
in welfare litigation since 1967 to the lawyers sponsored by the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity and the increased receptivity of the courts to "cases brought against government
officials on issues involving the rights of individuals." Id. at 7-8.
For a comprehensive discussion of the development of public interest law in the late
1960's, see Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
44. 415 U.S. at 653-56. The AABD at that time was a federal categorical aid program
administered by the states. Since January 1, 1974, this program has been administered by
the federal government and has become known as Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1976). The Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) Program remains the major federal categorical grant program administered by the
states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-660 (1976).
45. 415 U.S. at 655-56.
46. Id. at 655.
47. Jordan v. Swank, No. 71 Civ. 70 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1972).
48. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 32:364
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withheld.49 The Seventh Circuit based its holding on two critical
factors. First, the plaintiffs were asking for "equitable restitution"
rather than for compensatory damages-the latter remedy fore-
closed by the eleventh amendment." Second, the court believed
that retroactive relief was essential to prevent the defendants from
benefiting from their own illegal acts.5
The United States Supreme Court reversed the district court
order of retroactive benefits. 2 The Court refused to extend Ex
.pane Young to encompass monetary awards not ancillary to the
injunction against the state official.53 The Court rejected the Sev-
enth Circuit's distinction between payment of damages and an
award of retroactive monetary relief.54 As the Court observed, it
was a "virtual certainty" that the award in either case would be
paid from the state treasury." Similarly, the Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit's alternative argument that even if the eleventh
amendment barred recovery of back benefits, the state had waived
its constitutional immunity56 by participating in the federally
49. Id. at 993-94.
50. Id. at 993.
51. Id. at 992, 994.
52. 415 U.S. at 664-66.
53. Id. at 664-69.
54. Id. at 668.
55. Id.
56. The Edelman Court adopted a two part test to determine if waiver of the 1 th
amendment occurred. First, Congress must evince a clear intent to abrogate the state's
immunity when it enacts a particular program. 415 U.S. at 671-74. Second, the state by its
participation must clearly intend to consent to such abrogation. The Court stated, "We
will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."'
Id. at 673 (citing Murry v. Wilson, 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). See Florida Dep't of Health
Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981) (reaffirming the strict standard
of "explicit intent"). See also infra note 103.
In applying the first prong of the test, the Edelman Court noted that the HEW regula-
tions provided federal financial assistance for court-ordered payments of retroactive bene-
fits. 415 U.S. at 675 n.17. See also 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(b)(2), (3) (1980) (present
regulations). The Court, however, concluded that their promulgation was "not determina-
tive of the constitutional issues here presented." 415 U.S. at 675 n.17.
The Court also distinguished the cases on which the Seventh Circuit relied to justify its
finding that congressional authorization was missing, Pardon v. Terminal R., 377 U.S. 184
(1964) and Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). The Court
emphasized that the federal statute involved in Pardon (Federal Employers Liability Act)
specifically authorized suits against the states or their instrumentalities, whereas no such
authorization could be found in the Social Security Act. 415 U.S. at 671-77. Petty was also
distinguishable since it involved an interstate compact permitting each party "to sue and be
sued in its own name." Id. at 672. Finally, the Court observed that a third case relied on by
the circuit court, Employees v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), actu-
ally cut against a waiver since the Court in that case refused to find a waiver even though
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funded AABD program. 7
After rejecting the Seventh Circuit's arguments, the Court held
that an award of back benefits for a violation occurring before the
court's injunction took effect would be the equivalent of a damage
award against the state, a remedy specifically prohibited by the
eleventh amendment. 8 Nevertheless, where the payment of mon-
the statutory language (Fair Labor Standards Act), expressly authorized suit against a gen-
eral class while leaving to implication that the class included states.
A question not raised in Edelman is whether a state official could effect a waiver of the
state's immunity through his or her conduct in limited circumstances. In Rothstein v. Wy-
man, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973), the affidavit of a state
official filed in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction asserted that
plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by denial of the injunction "since any sums ultimately
found to be owing them could be disbursed at that time." Id. at 238. The Second Circuit
found that this statement was not "authoritative" and could not be considered a "clear
manifestation of consent by the state." Id. at 239. The opinion, however, did not articulate
what would constitute "authoritative" and "clear" consent. A contrary result was reached
by the Seventh Circuit in Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 1008 (1975), which held that a statement almost identical to the one in Rothstein in a
memorandum opposing preliminary relief, constituted a waiver of state immunity. The
wording of the statement in Vargas is slightly more emphatic. "If she [plaintiff] is success-
ful on the merits, she will be awarded any benefits wrongfully withheld. ... Id. at 492.
Because the difference is minimal, it is clear that the Vargas court chose to take a different
approach than the Rothstein court, when it concluded that "[a] representation made in a
judicial proceeding for the purpose of inducing the court to act or refrain from acting
satisfies the requirements stated in Edelman." Id.
The representations made in Rothstein and Vargas occurred prior to the decision in the
Edelman case. It is not surprising then, that since Edelman no cases have been found in
which this kind of waiver has been claimed. State officials are not likely to represent that
they will pay back benefits when they know that the Court will not otherwise direct them to
do so.
A waiver has also been inferred where a state agreed to settle a claim for retroactive
relief prior to the Edelman decision and later tried to invoke the I th amendment after
Edelman was handed down. Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Vec-
chione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1977) (prior consent decree deemed a waiver
of immunity); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979). (parties' consent judgment constituted l1th amend-
ment waiver).
57. 415 U.S. at 671-74. The 11 th amendment has been deemed to create a jurisdic-
tional bar which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, id. at 678, yet the immunity
conferred by the amendment can be waived by the states or abrogated by congressional
action with the consent of the states. Id. at 671-77. See also Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 322 U.S. 47, 51, 53-54 (1944).
58. 415 U.S. at 667-68. The Edelman Court placed considerable reliance on Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), which held that the 1 th
amendment barred a taxpayer from recovering amounts paid under protest for state taxes.
415 U.S. at 463-64. The Court's reliance was misplaced since Ford involved a claim for the
return of state sales taxes, contained state law questions, and did not include a claim for
injunctive relief. Id. at 460, 463. Indeed the Court in Ford did not even discuss Young.
Edelman also cited with approval Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327
U.S. 573 (1946), in which a refund claimed for state taxes unconstitutionally assessed
against a nonresident corporation was deemed barred by the 11 th amendment. Id. at 576.
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ies from state funds is a necessary and often "inevitable conse-
quence" of compliance with a prospective court decree, neither Ex
'parte Young nor the eleventh amendment bars such a result.59
The dissenting opinions attacked the Court's premise that the
eleventh amendment applied in these circumstances. Justice
Douglas argued that Exparte Young was dispositive since there
was little difference in impact on the state treasury between pro-
spective and retroactive relief." Justice Douglas further main-
tained that the state's participation in the welfare program
constituted an implied consent to be sued.6 Moreover, Illinois
had continued to participate despite its awareness of Supreme
Court decisions affirming the award of retroactive welfare
benefits. 2
Justices Marshall and Blackmun also found that Illinois, by its
voluntary participation in the AABD program, had waived its
eleventh amendment immunity. 3 According to Justice Marshall,
Illinois had impliedly agreed to comply with the statute and regu-
lations and to subject itself to suit in federal court for any viola-
tions." Congress, reasoned Justice Marshall, has provided a
cause of action for violations of the Social Security Act in section
1983 and its remedy could not exclude awarding benefits illegally
withheld in the past.65 Congress intended a "full panoply of judi-
cial remedies to be available" in actions under section 1983.6
The words used by the Court expressing the rationale for its decision were ignored: "The
reason underlying the rule, which is discussed at length in the Reed and Ford cases, is the
right of a state to reserve for its courts the primary consideration and decision of its own tax
litigation because of the direct impact of such litigation upon its finances." Id. at 577.
Kennecoll, like Ford, made no reference to Young.
59. 415 U.S. 668-69.
60. Id. at 680-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 685-87.
62. Id. at 687.
63. Id. at 688-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Justice Marshall pointed to the Social Security Act provision requiring "fair
hearings," 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(4) (1976), and to the regulations providing that states must
make retroactive payment to successful recipients, 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1973), as evi-
dence of a statutory and regulatory scheme which contemplated retroactive correction of
past errors. 415 U.S. at 692-93. He also argued that HEW regulations which provide for
federal financial assistance in meeting court directed retroactive payments indicate HEW's
belief that such remedies were intended by Congress. Id. at 693.
65. Id. at 690-94.
66. Id. at 694.
Justice Marshall also noted that the Court did not resolve the issue of whether a judg-
ment rendered pursuant to the 14th amendment would provide a constitutional basis to
award retroactive benefits. He stated:
[Tlhere has been no determination in this case that state action is unconstitutional
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Anything less would provide "truncated justice. 67
After remand by the Supreme Court, the conflict between the
parties continued to percolate in the lower federal courts.68 In
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court necessarily does not decide
whether the States' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity may have been
limited by the later enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that
such a limitation is necessary to effectuate the purposes of that Amendment, an
argument advanced by an amicus in this case. In view of my conclusion that any
sovereign immunity which may exist has been waived, I also need not reach this
issue.
Id. at 694 n.2.
The Edelman Court, in overruling prior decisions, did not distinguish between cases
turning on statutory grounds and those decided under the 14th amendment. See, e.g., Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Since Edelman, no court has taken Marshall's bait
by finding the 11th amendment limited in effect by the 14th. Although the question has
been presented on several occasions, the courts have either avoided or rejected the notion
of such limitation. See, e.g., Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1182-84 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977). But see id. at 1186-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Weis-
bord v. Michigan State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Yuan Jen Cuk
v. Lackner, 448 F. Supp. 4, 7 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The claim also was raised on appeal to the
Supreme Court in Mauclet v. Nyquist, 406 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'don other
grounds, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court, however, denied cert. sub nom. Rabinovitch v.
Nyquist, 433 U.S. 901 (1977).
In Millikin v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), the Court noted that it would not decide
whether "the Fourteenth Amendment, ex proprio vigore works a pro tanto repeal of the
Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)." 433 U.S. at 291 n.23.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will address this issue later.
There are strong arguments suggesting that the 14th amendment possesses independent
vigor which does not require congressional action to effectuate its purposes. See
Jagnandon v. Giles, 538 F.2d at 1186-90 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Since
Congress is unlikely to provide relief for every 14th amendment violation, in the absence of
a self-executing force, "the fourteenth amendment's promise of full protection of individual
rights might remain unfulfilled in many cases. ... Id. at 1188.
67. 415 U.S. at 696 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)). Justice Brennan in a separate, dissenting opinion found that the
absence of language in the I 1th amendment barring suits against a state by its own citizens
rendered the amendment inoperative in this case. He believed the issue should be deter-
mined by general principles of sovereign immunity which he resolved by looking to Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution respecting powers granted to Congress by the States. In Bren-
nan's view, this section of the Constitution should be interpreted as a surrender of state
sovereign immunity. 415 U.S. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Edelman's impact was mitigated in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) and Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick the Court ruled that Congress could,
by enacting legislation pursuant to the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the 14th amend-
ment, override the bar of the I 1th amendment. In Fitzpatrick, a claim was made against
Connecticut for alleged sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The 1972 amendments to the Act authorized suits by private individuals for money dam-
ages. Since the Act was an exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the 14th amend-
ment, 11 th amendment immunity would not apply and retroactive benefits were awarded.
Under the Fitzpatrick formulation, consent of the state, either express or implied, is irrele-
vant. It should be noted that rejection by the courts of the theory that the 14th amendment
acts as a limitation on the 11th amendment was based substantially on Fitzpatrick. The
courts reasoned that since Fitzpatrick required congressional action under § 5 of the 14th
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1979, the dispute came before the Supreme Court again in Quern
v. Jordan.6 9 The issue there was whether the eleventh amendment
barred the district court from ordering the defendant state officials
to notify the members of the plaintiff class that their benefits had
been unlawfully denied and of their right to a state administrative
appeal.70 The district court ordered notice, but the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed after finding the procedure and the notice impermis-
sible under Edelman .71 The Seventh Circuit held that theform of
notice implied that state funds should be used to compensate
plaintiffs. In an en banc rehearing, however, the court said that
notice simply advising the class members of their right to state
administrative procedures would not conflict with Edelman.72 In
affirming the Seventh Circuit's reversal, the Supreme Court
agreed that such notice was merely informational and left it to the
state to decide whether retroactive benefits should be paid.73  As
long as the state was not required to make any payments, the elev-
amendment to override 11th amendment immunity, it is illogical to suppose that the desire
to override can be inferred in the absence of such action. See Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d
at 1184, 1185; Weisbord v. Michigan State Univ., 495 F. Supp. at 1355, 1356; Yuan Jen
Cuk v. Lackner, 448 F. Supp. at 7. See also Field, supra note 28, at 548-49.
In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act of 1976, which provides for the award of attorney's fees in any action filed under
specified civil rights statutes, authorizes the award of fees against a state by a federal court.
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court found that the Attorney's Fees Act was enacted pursuant to
congressional power to enforce the 14th amendment.
Despite Fitzfpatrick, Hutto and Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) (cities and other localities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and
therefore can be sued directly for money damages), the Court in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332 (1979), dashed any hopes that it was retreating from Edelman. $ee infra notes 69-75
and accompanying text.
69. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
70. Id. at 334.
71. Jordan v. Trainor, 551 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'g 405 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
72. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc).
73. 440 U.S. at 346-49.
This remedy is helpful only marginally since requiring each plaintiff who seeks retroac-
tive relief to file separate administrative proceedings is inefficient, expensive, and will not
ensure comprehensive relief.
On remand in Quern, notice was mailed to the more than 18,000 members of the plain-
tiff class; 3,811 persons responded. There were 69 additional responses from relatives of
class members who were no longer living. Letter from the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Chicago, Counsel for plaintiffs in Edelman and Quern to Norman Lichtenstein (June 16,
1981). Since state funds appropriated for this purpose had lapsed, it was necessary for
plaintiff to file an action in the state court of claims. That court ruled in favor of plaintiffs
and sums due to those members of the class who had come forward were finally paid. Petz
v. Illinois, 81 Ct. Cl. 1475 (1981); Richardson v. Illinois, 81 Ct. CL. 2107 (1981).
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enth amendment would not be violated.74
Quern resolved the notice issue but did not supply any new
analysis or justification for the Edelman doctrine. Quern never-
theless reaffirmed Edelman and laid to rest questions raised by
later cases as to Edelman's vitality.
75
B. Analysis
The Edelman rationale for applying the eleventh amendment
as a bar to retroactive relief may be viewed as containing three
elements: 1) retroactive relief looks to a past time when a defend-
ant state official was not under a court-ordered obligation to com-
ply with federal law. Injunctive relief, permissible under the
eleventh amendment, can only be directed to the future and may
not be used to correct unlawful conduct in the past;7 6 2) retroac-
tive benefit awards disrupt the ability of the state to allocate its
limited financial resources in ways prospective injunctive relief
74. 440 U.S. at 347-48.
75. Id. at 338-49. In a section superfluous to the decision, the Court said that a state
was not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 338-45. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan was highly critical of this result because he believed the Court should not
address or decide issues not presented by the parties. Id. at 350. Justice Brennan argued
that cases decided subsequent to Edelman supported the basic premise that § 1983 abro-
gated state immunity under the 11 th amendment. He contended that the Court's ruling in
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a municipality
was a "person" for § 1983 purposes, left "at least an open question" as to whether a state
was also a person under § 1983. If true, then § 1983 (originally enacted as the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 to enforce the provisions of the 14th amendment) would embody a congres-
sional intent to override the states' 1 th amendment immunity. 440 U.S. at 350-54. See
also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976) (Congress had the power to abrogate the
states' immunity by specific action).
In support of his argument, Justice Brennan cited at length to the Civil Rights Act's
legislative history in an effort to show that Congress intended the term "person" in § 1983
to encompass states as well as local units of government. 440 U.S. at 354-66. Justice Rehn-
quist dismissed Justice Brennan's legislative history as "slender," id. at 341, while Justice
Brennan accused the Court of choosing "to hear in the eloquent and pointed legislative
history of § 1983 only 'silence."' Id. at 365.
Although supported by dicta, it would appear that a clear majority of the Court (seven
members, excluding Justice Marshall's concurrence with Justice Brennan) do not find
§ 1983 as a basis for overriding 1 th amendment immunity. In lamenting the Quern ruling
on this issue, one federal judge wrote:
Reluctantly, this Court is bound by Quern's limited reading of the legislative his-
tory of Section 1983 and its holding that a State is not a "person" within the
meaning of the statute. The Court today must reject the persuasive and haunting
voices of a previous era which would not let any form of body politic claim supe-
riority over the Constitutional rights of the people.
Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
76. 415 U.S. at 668-69.
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does not;77 3) retroactive benefits are equivalent to damages and
are therefore not a constitutionally permissible component of the
equitable relief available under the doctrine of Exparte Young.78
Each proposition has serious conceptual or practical shortcom-
ings. If, ideally, the law treats like cases alike, then a requirement
that the eleventh amendment's bar turn on timing of the injunctive
relief is irrational; a difference in timing should have no bearing
on the facts or issues of two otherwise similar cases. Additionally,
state expenditures in compliance with prospective injunctive relief
are often more costly than retroactive benefit awards. Finally, eq-
uitable restitution and damages are in fact distinct remedies.
1. Correction of Past Errors
Edelman clearly permits federal courts to grant forward-look-
ing injunctive relief even if compliance by state officials entails
payment of substantial sums from the state treasury.79 The critical
factor in this formulation is the date the court's injunction is is-
sued. Benefits wrongfully withheld before that date cannot be re-
covered, but they may not be withheld thereafter.8" Future benefit
payments which an injunction can compel do not differ from past
benefits wrongfully withheld, for which no injunction will issue."'
As one court observed, the power of the court to act turns on the
speed with which judicial intervention can be obtained. The criti-
cal issue ought to be, however, "whether the court has [the] au-
thority to control the distribution of these financial resources. If it
has that control, prospective and retroactive equitable relief
77. Id. at 666 n.11.
78. Id. at 668 (pointing to the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
79. Id. at 667-68.
80. Id. See also Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
1008 (1975); D'Iorio v. County of Del., 447 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa.), vacated on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1978). Both of these cases are discussed in the Appendix
infra pp. 401, 408).
In Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court issued a tempo-
rary restraining order on March 20, 1974 providing that all state SSI benefits due and un-
paid for March shall be paid. The court found that these payments would not be
retroactive and thus barred under Edelman since they were due during the same month.
See also Porter v. Schweiker, 527 F. Supp. 150 (D. Minn. 1981); Yuan Jen Cuk v. Lackner,
448 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (no recovery of benefits until after final order providing
injunctive relief); Taylor v. Hill, 377 F. Supp. 495, 496 (W.D.N.C. 1974), vacated and rem'd,
529, F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1975).
81. In both cases, the monies sought are specifically determined on the basis of eligi-
bility. The only distinguishing factor is the time when such benefits are due. Retroactive
benefits are those payable prior to the issuance of a court injunction. Edelman 415 U.S. at
668.
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should be possible. 8 2
Edelman blithely ignored the fact that although the defendant
state official was not under a court-imposed obligation in the past,
the official was under a federally imposed obligation which was
violated.83 Thus, a forward-looking injunction merely orders the
official to comply with the official's ongoing federal obligations.
The forward-looking injunction adds nothing of legal significance
to the duties expected of the state official. Thus, when a court
treats cases arising before an injunction the same way as cases
arising after an injunction, such court acts consistently with its eq-
uitable power as defined in Exparte Young; such equitable power
may be exercised to prevent state officials from acting illegally in
violation of federal law.84
The defendant state official might also be viewed as commit-
ting a continuing violation of federal law which a federal court
should be empowered to enjoin. Simply put, the bar of the elev-
enth amendment should not be made to turn on the timing of an
injunction, but rather on the substance of the relief sought.
2. Impact on the State Treasury
Central to Edelman's holding is the notion that an award of
retroactive benefits will cost great sums of money and thereby in-
terfere with the state's fiscal process. The Court emphasized that
an award of back benefits "will to a virtual certainty be paid from
state funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state offi-
cials. ... 86 Yet the Court acknowledged that injunctive relief
82. 447 F. Supp. at 239.
In Yearby v. Parham, 415 F. Supp. 1236, 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1976), the district court judge
took the position that state AFDC funds which were directed to be paid into a court escrow
account prior to the issuance of an injunction would escape classification as retroactive
benefits and could be awarded to the plaintiffs consistent with Edelman.
83. The district court in Edelman found § 4004 of the Illinois Categorical Assistance
Manual invalid insofar as it conflicted with 45 C.F.R. 206.10(a)(3) (1973)'s mandate that
applications for assistance be processed within specific time limits. 415 U.S. at 656. It is
difficult to imagine that the state defendants who delayed some applications for months did
not realize that they were violating federal law. Id. at 655-56. Of course, in any case
where injunctive relief is directed against a state official by a federal judge, there must be a
finding that federal law (constitutional, statutory, or regulatory) has been violated.
84. 209 U.S. at 159-60; see also Thornton, supra note 37, at 311-12.
85. 415 U.S. at 666 n.ll.
86. Id. at 668. Of course if recovery is sought against state officials in their individual
capacities the 1 Ith amendment would not operate as a bar to recovery. Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See also American Civil Liberties Union v. Finch, 638 F.2d
1336 (5th Cir. 1981) (claim against state governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and
commissioner of safety in their individual capacities allowed). However, in such instances
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which restrains future conduct may also have a substantial impact
on a state's treasury and that such impact is a permissible conse-
quence of the principle announced in Exparte Young.87 Thus, the
majority recognized, as did Justice Douglas in his dissent, that
"most welfare decisions by federal courts have a financial impact
on the States."8"
The majority, however, sought to distinguish between the im-
pact of paying benefits prospectively and retroactively. 9 Accord-
ing to the Court, retroactive benefits "invariably mean there is less
money available for payments for the continuing obligations of
the public aid system." 90 The Court, however, ignored the fact
that any benefits paid by the state will reduce the funds generally
available for public assistance programs. Indeed, prospective ben-
efits are likely to have a far greater effect on a state's ability to
allocate its resources than will retroactive benefits.9 The in-
creased costs which the state will incur in the future are open-
ended, whereas retroactive relief is confined to a specific time pe-
riod and thus is limited in amount. This applies whether the court
directs the payment of benefits unforeseen by the state or whether,
as in Edelman, the benefits are to be paid at an accelerated rate.
The finding by the Edelman majority of a more significant impact
on a state treasury when retroactive relief is awarded is therefore
unjustified.
3. Retroactive Benefits are Damages and Do Not Constitute
Allowable Equitable Relief
In delineating the kind of relief which Exparte Young permits,
the Edelman Court held that a federal court is empowered to or-
der expenditure of funds from a state treasury if "ancillary" to
injunctive relief.92 The test is whether relief is a "necessary conse-
good faith in carrying out official duties would be a defense and the ultimate recovery
where significant amounts are involved would be limited.
87. 415 U.S. at 667-78.
88. Id. at 680-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 666 n.11.
90. Id.
91. See, eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977); Edelman, 415 U.S. at
683-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92. 415 U.S. at 668. The 11th amendment makes no distinction between actions in
law or equity. It can therefore be argued that once the right to sue public officials for
violation of federal law is established, it should not matter whether the remedy is legal or
equitable. Injunctive relief against official misconduct, however, was the exception carved
out by Young and approved by Edelman. It is the propriety of awarding retroactive relief
in conjunction with that remedy which was at issue in Edelman.
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quence of compliance in the future . . . . Anything else was
regarded as damages forbidden by the eleventh amendment.94 In
so finding, the Court failed to analyze the remedy of equitable
restitution. Its holding, that restitution is "indistinguishable"
from damages,95 was not supported by its reasoning. Indeed, the
Court ignored its own words in Porter v. Warner Co. :96
Restitution ... may be considered as an equitable adjunct to
an injunction decree. Nothing is more clearly a part of the sub-
ject matter of a suit for an injunction than the recovery of that
which has been illegally acquired and which has given rise to
the necessity for injunctive relief.97
The majority also ignored the distinction between the restora-
tive nature of retroactive relief and the compensatory nature of
damages.98 An illuminating analysis distinguishing retroactive re-
lief from damages is found in D'Iorio v. County of Delaware,"
which involved a section 1983 claim by a dismissed detective for
restoration of his position.' ° In D'Iorio, Judge Lord viewed ret-
roactive remedies as necessary adjuncts to the federal courts' equi-
table powers to enjoin official misconduct:
Such remedies are intended to prevent, correct or terminate
unconstitutional conduct by public officials. Thus, a court
could issue an injunction preventing an official from wrong-
fully withholding monetary benefits. Equitable monetary relief
is simply the retroactive application of such an order. This re-
93. Id. at 668.
94. Id. at 668-69.
95. Id. at 668. In support of its position, the Court suggested that the district court's
view of awarding retroactive relief would require Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas-
ury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), to be overruled. Id. at 668-69. Ford, however, was concerned
with state tax procedures and state law issues not present in Edelman. See supra note 58.
96. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
97. Id. at 399. Justice Rehnquist, attempting to distinguish Porter, stated that "it did
not purport to decide the availability of equitable relief consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment." 415 U.S. at 672-73 n.15. Porter, however, allows the scope of injunctive
relief to include restoration of lost entitlements. See also Mitchell v. Robert De Mario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), in which the Court affirmed "the historic power of eq-
uity to provide complete relief," including retroactive awards. Id. at 292.
98. 415 U.S. at 668, 669.
99. 447 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa.), vacatedon other grounds, 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1978).
Judge Lord distinguished Edelran, asserting that all forms of equitable relief were avail-
able against counties and other localities (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). Lord concluded that if back pay could be classified as a
form of equitable relief instead of damages, it properly could be awarded by the court in
this § 1983 action. His analysis of damages and equitable restitution contrasts with the lack
of any significant discussion of the issue in Edelman and supports the position that these
remedies are in fact distinguishable. 447 F. Supp. at 237-39.
100. Id.
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lief differs from a request for damages because it does not seek
to measure the harm done plaintiff (such as consequential dam-
ages) but rather it is aimed at effecting the appropriate transfer
of governmental benefits. 101
A claim for damages stands in a very different posture:
[D]amage relief is not concerned with halting the unconstitu-
tional conduct of public officials but rather is intended to com-
pensate the victim of such conduct for harm done. The funds
from which such relief will come are not related to such con-
duct and no form of equitable relief can reach these financial
resources. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the
sources of those funds. . . and not the offending official is the
entity being held liable.'0 2
Equitable restitution and damages are, in fact, distinct reme-
dies designed to effectuate different results. The failure of the
Edelman Court to recognize these differences underlies its appli-
cation of the eleventh amendment as a limitation on the equitable
powers of the federal courts. 10 3
III. THE TWILIGHT ZONE
The theoretical shortcomings of Edelman v. Jordan have pro-
duced much confusion. The artificiality of Edelman's distinction
between prospective and retroactive relief, for example, has com-
plicated determinations of whether relief sought is prospective or
retroactive for eleventh amendment purposes. This section will
review the Edelman legacy and the difficulties inherent in applica-
tion of the Edelman rule.
A. Nature ofthe Remedy- When is Relief Retroactive?
Edelman held that applicability of the eleventh amendment
turns on timing of injunctive relief rather than on the substance of
relief sought. Although this artificial distinction worked in
Edelman, other situations may present problems. If, for example,
a state were to violate federal law by improperly notifying recipi-
ents of a planned reduction in government benefits, it is unclear
101. Id. at 238-39.
102. Id. at 239.
103. The Edelman Court could have reached a different result without abandoning the
long-held rule of a state's 11th amendment immunity from suits by its own citizens in
federal courts. Retroactive relief fits neatly into the exception of Young since it reaches
conduct which violated federal law and is thus beyond the authority of the state official in
question. Thus, there should be no distinction between past correction of illegal acts and
future restraint. To have so held would not have affected the I th amendment protection
afforded to the states against open-ended suits for damages.
. 1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
whether a federal court order directing officials to continue bene-
fits at prereduction levels would be retroactive or prospective.
A number of courts have wrestled with the question. At issue
in Kimble v. Solomon"° was Maryland's planned reduction in
medicaid benefits without proper notice 0 5 which, the district
court found, violated federal regulations on benefit reductions.106
Manifesting considerable frustration with the harshness com-
pelled by Edelman, the district court nonetheless refused to re-
quire restoration of benefits, while noting that prospective relief
enjoining the improper notice was appropriate.107
The court of appeals, however, held that Edelman permitted
an order of "prospective restoration" of benefits at prereduction
levels to continue for at least ten days after Maryland had mailed
"timely and adequate notice of the reduction."' 1 8 This seemingly
modest remedy, which provided no benefits for accrued medical
expenses, evoked a short, acerbic dissent which asserted that the
majority opinion would completely destroy the Edelman decision
"by devising allegedly prospective procedures for the purpose of
assuring the payment of retrospective benefits."' 10 9
In Kimble, the appellate court was divided as to whether the
relief was retroactive or prospective. In effect, the Fourth Circuit
majority directed nunc pro tunc restoration of eligible recipients
to their position before the state's illegal reduction." 0 The major-
ity rejected the distinction urged by defendants that a remedy for
a "continuing wrong" would be prospective and thus permissible,
but a remedy for the "continuing effects of a past wrong" would
be retroactive and thus impermissible.' Accordingly, the court
noted that "[a]s the Edelman and Milliken cases show, the proper
focus of eleventh amendment scrutiny is on the nature of the relief
sought, not the wrong committed.""' 2 In other words, the
Edelman rule is satisfied so long as the relief provided only covers
104. No. Y-76-210 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 1977), rev'd, Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).
105. 599 F.2d at 602.
106. Id.
107. ld. at 602-03. In a letter to counsel for plaintiff the court stated: "I confess that I
find the signing of this order as distasteful as anything I have done in my capacity as a
judicial officer. However, I have reviewed the applicable law and this action is taken reluc-
tantly in light of the language of [Edelman v. Jordan] ....
108. Id. at 605.
109. Id. at 606 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 604-06.
111. Id. at 604 n.6.
112. Id.
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expenses to be accrued in the future."'
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision, two other courts
adopted the Kimble court's holding. The Third Circuit in Eder v.
Beall"4 required Pennsylvania to reinstate a medicaid eyeglass
program until the state gave proper notice of its intention to stop
benefits." 5  In Stenson v. Blum,116 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York likewise required New York to
provide prospective restoration of medicaid benefits until the state
gave both appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing." 7
During this waiting time, payment of benefits was required, and
plaintiffs had to be restored to their former status as medicaid
eligibles.'
Kimble, Eder and Stenson did not direct payment of benefits
for expenses accrued in the past, but rather called for restoration
of improperly terminated benefit entitlements. These cases are en-
tirely consistent with Edelman, since they do not order restoration
of pre-injunction loss of benefits. They are, however, indicative of
the problem inherent in the Edelman rule: the artificial distinction
between reinstatement of a former entitlement and the restoration
of benefits lost prior to court action. By permitting prospective
relief while barring retroactive relief, Edelman requires federal
courts to disregard compelling circumstances which militate in
favor of equitable intervention." 9
113. Id. at 605-06.
114. 609 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 701.
116. 476 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), a 'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 885 (1980).
117. The district court determined that automatic termination of medicaid benefits to
persons found no longer eligible for SSI violated federal regulations. Id. at 1337-42. The
state must determine the continuing eligibility of each person for medicaid, provide proper
notice before any cutoff, and afford an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 1341. During this
time, benefits must continue for plaintiffs restored to their former status as medicaid
eligibles.
118. Id See also Turner v. Walsh, 435 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1977). The court
directed that AFDC recipients be temporarily restored to a prior level of assistance for
AFDC and medicaid payments pending proper steps taken by the state regarding notifica-
tion of the reduction and the provision of an opportunity for a hearing.
119. A recent case which graphically illustrates this point is Coalition for Basic Human
Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981). In King, Massachusetts had failed to issue
checks owed to 145,000 recipients of AFDC benefits and Massachusetts General Relief.
On July 1, 1981, the date checks were to be issued, plaintiffs appeared in court seeking a
temporary restraining order directing payment. The district court denied relief. Two
weeks later, however, the circuit court granted an injunction requiring issuance of checks
due o1i July 16, 1981, but did not require issuance of checks which had been withheld for
the first two weeks of the month. Citing Edelman, the court drew the line at "prospective"
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B. Ancillary Relief and the Costs of "Prospective Compliance"
In Quern v. Jordan,12° the defendants did not raise the issue of
expenses for notifying.the plaintiff class about possible state ad-
ministrative remedies. t2 ' The Fifth Circuit recently confronted
this issue in Silva v. Vowell,' 2 2 where plaintiffs challenged a Texas
welfare regulation declaring that Aid t6 Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) assistance would be unavailable if the father
were "capable of light work."' 123 The district court ordered Texas
officials to issue a Quern-type notice advising plaintiff class mem-
bers of their right to file an administrative claim for back bene-
fits. 124  On appeal, defendants claimed that the eleventh
amendment barred the district court's order because the cost of
sending such notice was significant and would be paid from state
funds.'25 The Fifth Circuit ruled that an advisory notice under
Quern was "ancillary" to prospective injunctive relief, and that
therefore, the costs involved were not the kind of retroactive
charge barred under Edelman.126  Under the court's interpreta-
tion, Quern held that "it is the character of an expense, whether
'ancillary' or not, rather than the amount, that is determinative as
to whether there is an Eleventh Amendment issue." 27 The Fifth
Circuit noted Quern's reliance on Milliken v. Bradley,128 where
compliance with the desegregation order cost the Detroit school
system six million dollars.' 29
Both Quern and Edelman focused on the relief sought rather
relief. Id at 842. Thus, relief covering the first part of the month could not be provided
even though plaintiffs appeared in district court on a timely basis and the district court's
failure to act was deemed erroneous. In King, Massachusetts did not contend that the
claimants were not entitled to aid, but only that administrative considerations justified non-
payment. The artificiality of the Edelman rule was never more evident.
120. 440 U.S. 32. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
121. Id at 347, 347 n.19.
122. 621 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub noma, Johnston v. Silvia, 449 U.S.
1125 (1981).
123. Id at 643.
124. Id at 650-51.
125. Id
126. Id at 650-53. "The notice to this class is well within the prospective-compliance
exception referred to in Ailliken, and the bald assertion that it will cost too much is insuffi-
cient to invoke the proscriptions of the Eleventh Amendment." Id at 653. See also Lewis
v. Shulimson, 534 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1976); Mehler v. Blum, No. 80 Civ. 3531 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 1981).
127. 621 F.2d at 652-53.
128. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
129. Id at 293 (Powell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 32:364
RETROA CTIVE RELIEF
than on the sums involved. 130 Impact on the state treasury be-
comes significant, according to those cases, only if such impact is
retroactive in nature.131 If an expense relates to "prospective com-
pliance" with an injunction, it will not violate the eleventh
amendment regardless of its financial impact on the state.132 The
problem is that what constitutes "ancillary" relief or "prospective
compliance" has not yet been defined clearly.
The Supreme Court in Quern and the Fifth Circuit in Silva
rejected an extension of Edelman that would have kept federal
courts from ordering that plaintiffs be provided proper notifica-
tion of their rights. The result of these two cases, while sensible,
represents a further extension of a legal fiction; notification to a
class of available state administrative remedies is not essential to a
court's granting of a future injunction. Quern's characterization
of the court's order of notice, however, avoids further limitation
on relief a federal court may grant.
C. Recovery of Federal Benefts Unlawfully Taken by the State
Edelman was based on the premise that an award of benefits
unlawfully denied in the past is "indistinguishable. . . from an
award of damages against the state" and has the same effect on the
state treasury. 133 Edelman, however, involved welfare benefits. 134
Thus, it is questionable whether Edelman also bars recovery of
purely federal benefits illegally taken by the state from the hands
of recipients. Courts presented with this issue generally assume
that Edelman applies.135
In Fanty v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare136
plaintiffs challenged Pennsylvania's requirement that state welfare
recipients reimburse the state with their Social Security benefits. 137
130. In Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668, Justice Rehnquist conceded that "[s]uch an ancilliary
effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the
principle announced in Exparte Young.
131. 415 U.S. at 668-69.
132. Since Edelman, courts have found that costs and even fines for contempt can be
awarded "ancilliary" to injunctive relief. See e.g., Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1974); Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974);
Thompson v. Walsh, 481 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Welsch v. Likens, 68 F.R.D. 589
(D. Minn. 1975).
133. 415 U.S. at 668.
134. Edelman was concerned solely with unpaid benefits, supported by both federal
and state funding, due to recipients. Id at 653-56.
135. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
136. 551 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979).
137. Id at 3.
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After litigation began, Pennsylvania stopped this practice, but
plaintiffs sought recovery of benefits unlawfully taken by the state.
Both the district court and the court of appeals, citing Edelman,
ruled that the eleventh amendment barred recovery.' 38 Neither
court distinguished between the claim to recover state welfare
benefits wrongfully withheld, as in Edelman, and plaintiffs' claim
for the return of federal benefits illegally collected by the state. 39
Edelman, however, is clearly distinguishable from Fanty in terms
of the impact a pro-plaintiff court order would have on the state
treasury; in Fanty, unlike Edelman, court-ordered disgorgement
would simply restore the status quo.
Moore v. Colautti14° reached the same result as Fanty. In
Moore, public assistance recipients sought the return of illegally
taken SSI benefits used to reimburse state welfare grants. 41 As in
Fanty, the court applied Edelman without distinguishing between
reimbursement and benefit withholding.
The Second Circuit, in McAuliffe v. Carlson, 142 similarly failed
to distinguish a claim for the return of federal Social Security ben-
efits unlawfully seized to defray the costs of a mental patient's care
from a claim for improperly withheld state benefits. '43 The court
reasoned that recovery of funds wrongfully taken, like recovery of
benefits wrongfully withheld, would require payment from the
state treasury, 144 and thus "the effect upon the fisc is the same." 145
Far from compelling such a conclusion, Edelman fails even to pro-
vide support. Edelman deemed the eleventh amendment to bar
payment "from the general revenues of the State of Illinois
... ,146 Clearly, federal Social Security and SSI benefits are not
part of a state's general revenues because the state does not raise
these funds by state taxes. Thus, the critical impact triggering
138. Id at 3-5. In Fanty a divided court also let stand the ruling of the District Court
that notification to plaintiff class that the class may have had a state law claim for the
return of benefits constituted a violation of Edelman. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
took note of Fan!) in Quern and made passing reference to the denial of retroactive relief,
indicating neither approval nor disapproval. 440 U.S. at 334 n.2.
139. Id
140. 483 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1979), af'd, 633 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980).
141. Id at 360-62.
142. 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
143. Id at 1308.
144. Id
145. Id If the Carlson test is one of bare impact on state fisc in terms of cash outflow,
then whether it survives Quern's approval of certain notices to plaintiff class members is
open to question.
146. 415 U.S. at 665 (emphasis added). See also Travelers Indemnity v. School Bd. of
Dade County, 666 F.2d 505, 509 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 32:364
RETROCTIVE RELIEF
eleventh amendment protection is lacking. Moreover, an award
of federal benefits will not interfere with a state's budgeting pro-
cess or its ability to allocate scarce state tax revenues for other
public assistance recipients. Thus, unlawfully taken federal bene-
fits, unlike other property, should be restorable without violating
the rule in Edelman.
A result contrary to Fanty, Moore, and McAuliffe was reached
in Meade v. Hawaii Housing Authoriy, 4 7 where low income ten-
ants sought recovery of rent overcharges from a state-adminis-
tered but federally subsidized housing authority. 4 ' Since the
authority derived its revenues entirely from monthly rentals and
federal subsidies, the court found that there was no impact on the
state treasury and, therefore, that the eleventh amendment did not
apply.14 9 Meade was based on sound reasoning. The basis for
eleventh amendment immunity is removed when a state is not re-
quired to expend funds collected in the exercise of its taxing
power to satisfy the judgment.
D. Retroactive Relief Sought Against a County, Municioality or
Other Local Unit of Government
Edelman recognized that "a county does not occupy the same
position as a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment."' 50
Furthermore the Court noted that "while county action is gener-
ally state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
county defendant is not necessarily a state defendant for purposes
of the Eleventh Amendment."'15' Yet Edelman did not resolve
whether a suit against county officials pursuing state policy could
end in retroactive relief.'52 Local political units in many states
administer public assistance programs subject to state agency su-
pervision. 53 This hybrid system is neither clearly state nor clearly
local because while local officials administer the programs, state
147. No. 74-46 (D. Hawaii Apr. 15, 1975).
148. [1974-1976] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 21,092.
149. Id The issues raised in Meade also were presented, but not resolved, in Lopez v.
Arraras, 606 F.2d 347, 349 (Ist Cir. 1979).
150. 415 U.S. at 667 n.12.
151. Id
152. Id
153. Eighteen states, including New York, Ohio, and California, operate welfare pro-
grams through local units of government. In the other states, the programs are either oper-
ated entirely by a state agency or on a hybrid basis. See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT
CHILDREN UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, TITLE IV-A (September, 1979).
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funds are often used in some measure, thus raising Edelman con-
cerns for the state fisc.
In 1979, faced with such a hybrid system in Holley v. Lavine, 15
4
the Second Circuit held that the eleventh amendment did not bar
retroactive relief against the county administering the welfare pro-
gram even though twenty-five percent of the funds came from the
state. The Second Circuit noted, however, that a fifty percent state
contribution might require a different result.I55 In Holley, plain-
tiff challenged a state statute denying state welfare to citizen chil-
dren of an illegal alien residing in New York.'5 6 The court of
appeals affirmed the district court decision enjoining the act as
violating federal law and awarded retroactive relief against the
county, but denied relief against the state defendants.'57 Applying
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 5 '
the Holley Court's test for eleventh amendment application was
whether the County Department of Social Services was an arm of
the state. 159 The county had an independent responsibility to pro-
vide public assistance to needy persons and independently had ap-
pointed the defendant county commissioner. Further, the County
had its own taxing powers. 160 The state was not required to reim-
burse the county department for any adverse judgments. 16 1 The
state's twenty-five percent share of welfare payments did not cre-
ate an unconstitutional burden on the state treasury. 162 In this re-
spect the court wrote:
It is one thing to indulge in the semi-fiction that a state needs
Eleventh Amendment protection for the full amount of a judg-
ment against a state commissioner for past AFDC benefits,
when half of the money will come back to the state from the
federal government. The argument becomes strained when the
judgment is against the County defendant and the State will
eventually bear only 25 percent of the total. 163
The court suggested that there is a point at which the impact on
154. 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
155. See id. at 644.
156. Id at 640-41.
157. Id at 645-48.
158. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
159. 605 F.2d at 643-45.
160. Id at 644-45.
161. Id Where a county is directed by a court to duplicate grants previously provided,
state reimbursement is required. In this case, 11 th amendment immunity would be present.
See Fields v. Blum, 629 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1980).
162. 605 F.2d at 644.
163. Id
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the state treasury would be considered insufficient to trigger the
eleventh amendment.
Besides their assertion of eleventh amendment issues, the de-
fendants in Holley claimed good faith immunity, since they were
enforcing supposedly valid state law."6 The court found:
[There is] no good faith defense to a claim for AFDC benefits
that have been found to be due and owing. Moreover, there
should be no good faith defense to a claim for AFDC benefits
that were wrongfully withheld, since such an award puts de-
fendants in no worse position than if they had initially com-
plied with their obligation. 65
The court was bootstrapping in Holley. At the time, however,
it did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in
Owen v. City oflndependence,166 holding that municipalities could
not claim good faith immunity in suits alleging unconstitutional
conduct by local officials.1 67 Good faith will protect a local official
from personal liability but will not protect the local treasury from
his or her unlawful acts.' 61 Owen significantly bolstered the Hol-
ley approach since local officials could not thereafter use good
faith as a defense in actions brought against such officials for their
execution of state laws. Shortly after its decision in Owen, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Holley.16
9
The Seventh Circuit also has reviewed the applicability of
eleventh amendment immunity to a county welfare department.
In Mackey v. Stanton, 7' the court found that the eleventh amend-
ment did not bar a claim by AFDC recipients for support pay-
ments retained by a county welfare department in contravention
164. Id at 645-46.
165. Id at 645.
166. 445 U.S. 662 (1980).
167. Id at 657.
168. Id at 638 n.18, 653-55.
169. 446 U.S. 913 (1980). For later application of Holley, see Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F.
Supp. 749, 760 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (class of food stamp recipients entitled to retroactive bene-
fits from county defendant who violated due process requirements in attempting to reduce
the assistance level). Following Holley, the court noted that "[t]o do otherwise in this ac-
tion would permit the County. . . to violate federal rights with financial impunity." Id at
760.
Holley was also applied recently in three cases involving challenges to New York's
system of computing medicaid eligibility. See Markel v. Blum, 509 F. Supp. 942, 951
(N.D.N.Y. 1981); Jamroz v. Blum, 509 F. Supp. 953, 962 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Calkins v.
Blum, 511 F. Supp. 1073, 1098-1102 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 675 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1982). In
Markel, Jamroz, and Calkins, state and county defendants were enjoined and the county
defendants were compelled to pay retroactive benefits.
170. 586 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 882 (1979).
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of federal law. 7 ' The county department had its own taxing and
bonding powers and maintained a separate welfare fund sup-
ported by a special tax levy.172 The court's result was sound, even
though the department was subject to state supervision and re-
ceived substantial financial support from the state.' 73 As long as
the state was not required to reimburse the department for this
specific outlay, the eleventh amendment would not apply.174
In contrast, the same court in Carey v. Quern 175 found that a
claim for a clothing allowance against the Cook County Depart-
ment of Public Aid was constitutionally barred.176 The critical
fact in Carey was that the Cook County Director of Public Aid, as
a state. agent, collected monies placed in a special state-controlled
trust fund. 77 Hence, the financial independence factor of Mackey
was missing here.
Holley, Mackey, and Carey each focused on a number of fac-
tors relevant to the political entity's operation.1 78 The two most
critical factors were whether the local body exercised its own reve-
nue raising powers and whether it was primarily responsible for
providing public assistance to eligible persons within its jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, the court in each of those cases had to determine
171. Id at 1130-31.
172. Id
173. Id
174. Id
175. 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978).
176. Id at 23-34.
177. Id But see Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.I. 1975). A state unem-
ployment and disability fund collected from a limited group of persons was not part of the
state treasury and therefore not protected by 1 th amendment immunity even though ad-
ministered by a state official.
178. For other cases taking this approach, see Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College,
519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975) (public junior college is not an arm of the state); Hutchinson v.
Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); Cline v. School Dist. No. 32, 476 F. Supp. 868 (D. Neb. 1979)
(school district not an arm of the state); Doe v. Sullivan, 472 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Tex. 1979)
(sheriffis an officer of the state and county is an arm of the state); Knight v. Carlson, 478 F.
Supp. 55 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (county not an arm of the state); Savage v. Pennsylvania, 475 F.
Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aft'd, 620 F.2d 289 (3rd Cir. 1980) (liquor control board is an
arm of the state); Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (mental health board
is an arm of the state); WATCH v. Harris, 535 F. Supp. 9 (D.C. Conn. 1981) (urban re-
newal agency not an arm of the state); Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724
(5th Cir. 1982) (hospital district not an arm of the state).
This approach was also adopted in Degregorio v. O'Bannon, 86 F.R.D. 109 (E.D. Pa.
1980). There the court found that the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance was
deemed by the state courts to be a state agency, had its members appointed by the governor
and its administrative expenses paid directly by the state, was not financially independent,
and therefore was an arm of the state for 11 th amendment purposes. Id at 118.
[Vol. 32:364
RETROACTIVE RELIEF
whether the state was obligated to reimburse the locality for legal
judgments. The rule which may be derived from those cases,
therefore, is that for retroactive recovery to be allowed, the princi-
pal burden for judgment costs must fall on the locality and not the
state. In states where welfare is administered by independent lo-
cal units, the Holley/Mackey approach (along with that of
Owen) 179 provides a means for retroactive recovery of benefits
wrongfully withheld by local officials, provided that the state's
financial contribution to the locality meets Holley or Mackey
standards.
Joinder of state officials as defendants is not fatal to a plain-
tiff's case, since the state policy can be challenged as unlawful, and
the retroactive relief can be sought against only the local defend-
ants.'80 Where the state, however, administers welfare programs
itself, the eleventh amendment bars retroactive benefit recovery.
E. Waiver and the Court's Latest Word
In 1981, the Supreme Court issued its latest pronouncement on
retroactive relief and the eleventh amendment in Florida Depart-
ment of Health & Rehabilitation Service v. Florida Nursing Home
Association.' In Florida Nursing Home, a group of nursing
homes sought reimbursement for medicaid fees illegally withheld
by the state.' 82 The district court held that the eleventh amend-
ment barred such retroactive relief."3 Relying on two distinct ra-
tionales, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the state had
waived immunity.'8 4 First, the statute creating the Florida De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitation Services provided that the
agency could "sue and be sued."' 85 Second, Florida had agreed in
writing to be bound by federal regulations and guidelines applica-
ble to participation in the Title XIX medicaid program. 8 6 The
Fifth Circuit concluded: "[tjo bar federal jurisdiction in this case
could operate to immunize state officers and the agency from their
179. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
180. See, e.g., Calkins v. Blum, 511 F. Supp. at 1098-1102; Jamroz v. Blum, 509 F.
Supp. at 962; Markel v. Blum, 509 F. Supp. at 95 1.
181. 450 U.S. 147 (1981).
182. Id at 148.
183. Id at 148-49.
184. Id at 149. See Florida Nursing Home Ass'n v. Page, 616 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980).
185. 450 U.S. at 149.
186. Id
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contractual duty to adhere to federal statutory requirements."'' t 7
Within the year, however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the state's explicit agreement to comply with federal require-
ments "can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity,"' because the agreement was a "custom-
ary condition" for state participation in federal programs. 8 9 The
Court relied on Smith v. Reeves, 90 a pre-Young decision which
found that the state in enacting a waiver of this type, "has not
consented to be sued except in one of its own Courts. This is not
expressly declared in the statute, but such we think is its mean-
ing." 9 Thus, in accordance with this pronouncement, the Court
read Florida's waiver statute very restrictively.192
Since Edelman, most courts have approached the issue with
great caution, 19 finding waiver only occasionally.' 94 Thus, the
negative impact of Florida Nursing Home will not be severe. Had
the court affirmed, however, the state's general consent to be sued
ex contractu along with its contractual participation in a federal
program would have provided a new basis to bypass the eleventh
amendment and award retroactive relief.' 95
In the post-Edelman cases of Quern and Florida Nursing
Home, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its intention to restrict retro-
active relief in the federal courts. Regarding abrogation by Con-
187. 616 F.2d at 1363.
188. 450 U.S. at 150.
189. Id
190. 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
191. Id at 441.
192. Despite the Court's change in composition since Edelman (Justice Stevens re-
placed Justice Douglas), four Justices remain who believe that Edelman was decided incor-
rectly- Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 450 U.S. 151-55. Since the
decision in Florida Nursing Home, Justice O'Connor has replaced Justice Stewart who
stood with the majority in Edelman, Quern, and Florida Nursing Home.
193. See, e.g., Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1177 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977); Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74, 79 (6th Cir. 1975); Jones v. Illinois Dep't
of Rehabilitation Servs., 504 F. Supp. 1244, 1257 (N.D. Il. 1981); Weisbord v. Michigan
State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Gilchrist v. Califano, 473 F.
Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Savory v. Kawasaki Motor Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1216,
1217-18 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
194. See Soni v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Tenn., 513 F.2d 347, 352-53 (6th Cir.
1975) (provision in university charter stating that it may be sued "in any court of law or
equity in this State or elsewhere"); Tullock v. State Highway Comm'n, 507 F.2d 712, 715
(8th Cir. 1974) (waiver based on agreement to administer federal Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act); Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1222-24 (D.RI. 1980)
(general waiver in state statute).
195. The Fifth Circuit in Florida Nursing Home adopted this approach. 616 F.2d at
1363.
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gress pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, only in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer 196 and Hutto v. Finney197 has the Court approved a basis
for averting Edelman. 198
F. Reflections on a Paradox
One court recently observed that "[a]ny step through the look-
ing glass of the Eleventh Amendment leads to a wonderland of
judicially created and perpetuated fiction and paradox."19 9 This
view, evidently, is accurate. The eleventh amendment has been
interpreted to mean something other than what it says. °° It has
been held not to bar a suit for injunctive relief against a state offi-
cial, breaching the constitution or federal law, on the grounds that
this is not a suit against the state.20 1 Although deemed jurisdic-
tional, its protection may be waived and can be abrogated by
Congress.2 2 Edelman approved prospective injunctive relief no
matter how expensive but disapproved restoration of the same
benefits illegally withheld as inconsistent with the eleventh
amendment. °3
Edelman, however, has not prevented courts from directing
that plaintiffs be restored to a former status of entitlement, al-
196. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Recent examples of the application of the Fitzpatrick rule are
two cases holding that the Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-61 (1976), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (1976), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794, were
enacted by Congress pursuant to § 5 of the 14th amendment and, therefore, abrogate a
state's 1 th amendment immunity. Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517
(D. Haw. 1982); Parks v. Pakovic, 536 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. IM. 1982).
197. 437 U.S. 678, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978).
198. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether congressional abrogation may be
accomplished through the enactment of legislation under sections of the Constitution other
than the 14th amendment. Some courts have found that congressional enactments under
its Constitutional war powers, article I, § 8, cls. 11-13, override 11th amendment immuni-
ties. See, e.g., Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 967 (1979); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
For critical discussion of these decisions and the issues of waiver and abrogation, see
generally, M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 141-68 (1980).
199. Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1980).
200. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), (the llth amendment applies to
suits against a state by a citizen of that state). See also Cullison, supra note 28, at 22-24.
201. Expare Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Supreme Court has recently empha-
sized that the 11th amendment will apply to bar injunctive relief where there is no claim
that a state official acted contrary to federal law. Cory v. White, 103 S. Ct. 2325 (1982)
(federal interpleader action).
202. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964).
203. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651.
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though accumulated benefits cannot be paid.2° Particularly un-
fortunate, however, are the denials of retroactive relief when a
state has wrongfully appropriated federal benefits.20 5 Such cases
represent an unwarranted extension of Edelman, by allowing
states to retain monies not raised from state revenues and not be-
longing in the state treasury. The Supreme Court has not yet re-
viewed this issue.
Edelman may be avoided in states where public benefit pro-
grams or other state programs are administered by local units of
government.2 °6 Otherwise, resort to state administrative or state
court proceedings is necessary to obtain retroactive relief. For ex-
ample, some measure of relief may be obtained by requesting a
Quern notice advising plaintiffs and class members as to the avail-
ability of state administrative remedies.20 7 Federal court plaintiffs
may also pursue retroactive relief in state courts by using the fed-
eral court judgment as a basis for such relief.20 8 Of course, plain-
tiffs may sue a state official in his or her individual capacity to
obtain retroactive relief.
These approaches are limited and less than satisfactory.
Quern notices may not be understood by low income class mem-
bers and many, fearful of official notices, may be unlikely to re-
spond. Those who do respond must have their claims for
restitution reviewed by the very authority which originally denied
them. Suing on a federal judgment in state court may enable state
defendants to inject state law questions, including sovereign im-
munity issues, which must be resolved before relief is granted.
204. See Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979);
Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1979); Stenson v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
205. See Fanty v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 551 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979); Moore v. Colautti, 483 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aI'd, 633
F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980).
206. See Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913
(1980); Mackey v. Stanton, 586 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 882 (1979).
207. See, e.g., Folsom v. Blum, 87 F.R.D. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
208. See, e.g., Toomey v..Blum, 54 N.Y.2d 669, 426 N.E.2d 181, 442 N.Y.S.2d 774
(1981); Bardo v. Pennsylvania, 40 Pa. Commw. 585, 397 A.2d 1305 (1979).
For a discussion of sovereign immunity problems involved in state court actions, see
Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their
Own Courisfor Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 189 (1981). The federal courts,
moreover, remain the preferred forum for vindicating federal civil rights violations by state
officials. See id. at 193; supra note 30; Appendix infra pp. 397-418. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stated that § 1983 was enacted "to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights. ... Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 242 (1971).
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For suits against state officials in their individual capacities, a
finding of bad faith is necessary and recovery is doubtful where
substantial sums are involved. At bottom, the commencement of
separate proceedings to obtain full relief for the same matter rep-
resents an inefficient use of the time of litigants, administrators,
and courts.
The power to correct past illegal conduct is concomitant to en-
joining future illegal conduct. In separating remedies for future
and past action, Edelman has created a procedural schizophrenia,
thereby frustrating the federal court's ability to do "complete
rather than truncated justice. ' 209
CONCLUSION
Edelman unduly restricts the equitable powers of federal
courts and limits deserving litigants from recovering illegally
withheld public benefits. The Court's conclusions unnecessarily
extend the bar of the eleventh amendment. The Court failed to
analyze the nature of retroactive relief and neglected to discern its
proper relation to the granting of an injunction halting official
misconduct. Retroactive awards are not damages, but rather are
restitutory awards, providing plaintiffs with those sums to which
they were statutorily entitled.
The Edelman majority's determination to add yet another twist
to the tortuous history of the Eleventh Amendment may have
been motivated by a concern for principles of federalism. Such
concern, however, seems misdirected in this instance. The federal
courts' power to enjoin state officials who violate federal law was
clearly established in Ex parte Young and was confirmed in
Edelman. The grant to a federal court of the ability to order state
officials to correct retroactaively their past illegal conduct does not
209. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 696 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The difficulties encountered by federal courts in this regard were highlighted in the
recent Eighth Circuit decision, Nevels, HI v. Hanlon, 656 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1981). In
Neve/s, a former Nebraska state employee claimed his dismissal violated the due process
clause. He lost the state court action for reinstatement and back pay and then filed suit in
federal court. The district court found that his due process rights had been violated and
directed that plaintiff be reinstated or a new hearing held. The court awarded back pay
which represented restitution and denied damages directed against the defendant, commis-
sioner of labor in his official capacity Id at 377.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the award for retroactive relief based upon Edelman.
Thus, plaintiffNevels was denied any recovery of back pay and other employment benefits
lost due to his unlawful dismissal. The district court's common sense approach for provid-
ing full relief to the federal court plaintiff was frustrated by the Edelman rule.
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represent an extension of this power, but is totally consistent with
the federal courts' role as principal protectors of federal rights.
The Edelman rule does not contribute to efficient administra-
tion ofjustice. Edelman requires federal courts to distinguish arti-
ficially between the same kinds of public benefits, and to base
such distinction entirely on the timing of a judicial order. The
power of the federal courts to provide equitable relief should not
be restricted in this fashion. Furthermore, Edelman unwisely lim-
its the scope of injunctive relief available under the Young doc-
trine. Although the effect of these decisions may be avoided in
certain instances, they continue to limit the federal courts' ability
to remedy unlawful acts of state officials.
As one commentator has noted, "the legal system . . . suffers
damage when a court finds a violation of an individual's rights,
but is precluded by ancient concepts from granting a remedy.
This is precisely what happens when a federal court denies relief
pursuant to Edelman v. Jordan."21 0 According to Justice Stevens,
"[t]he arguments in favor of overruling Edelman are appealing
... ,, In light of the considerable impact which Edelman has
had, the Court should review these arguments and permit the fed-
eral courts to provide full equitable relief when federal rights are
violated.
210. Schwartz, Poverty Law, Supreme Court Developments, 185 N.Y.L.J. 115 (1981).
21 . Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n,
450 U.S. at 151.
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APPENDIX*
I. WELFARE BENEFITS
A. Retroactive Relief Denied
Stanton v. Carter1
Challenge to a state regulation requiring an applicant seeking assist-
ance due to separation or desertion of a spouse to prove that the
spouse has been absent for at least six months, absent exceptional
circumstances of need. Remanded in light of Edelman v. Jordan.
Doe v. Flowers2
Action challenging validity of state regulation requiring unmarried
mothers of applicants and recipients of AFDC benefits to cooperate
with welfare authorities by identifying putative fathers of the chil-
dren and initiating support or paternity proceedings against them.
Adams v. Harden3
Challenge to state regulation limiting sixteen-year-olds' eligibility for
AFDC benefits to those attending school or those physically unable
to attend school.
Barron v. Bellairs
4
Challenge to the state's use of the "averaging method" to compute
the income of AFDC recipients who were the intended beneficiaries
of court-ordered child support payments, but who were receiving
sporadic payments.
Wilson v. Weaver5
Challenge to state regulation denying AFDC benefits claimed on be-
half of an unborn child. Retroactive benefits denied on eleventh
amendment grounds.
Miburn v. Huecker6
Action involving AFDC benefits withheld because applicant had not
filed a paternity action against the putative father. Subsequent to the
initiation of the paterntiy action, benefits were approved.
* This appendix is a compendium of cases through October 15, 1981 (with an
addendum of additional cases decided through March 30, 1982) presenting federal courts
with claims for retroactive relief which were either denied on the basis of Edelman or
granted by distinguishing Edelman. Where relief was granted, the court's rationale for
distinguishing Edelman is set forth, except under the heading Notice to Class Cases. The
numerous Title VII employment discrimination cases have not been included. In these
cases, retroactive relief was awarded based on congressional abrogation of the 1 1th
amendment pursuant to § 5 of the 14th amendment.
1. 416 U.S. 918 (1974), vacating and remanding Carter v. Stanton, 350 F. Supp. 1337
(S.D. Ind. 1972).
2. 364 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), aif'd, 416 U.S. 922 (1974).
3. 493 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. 496 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975).
6. 500 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Rochester v. White7
Action against state officials for reducing AFDC benefits; plaintiffs
alleged that officials failed to give proper notice of reduction of
benefits.
Owens v. Roberts8
Allegation of unconstitutionality of statute relating to transfer of as-
sets as an exclusion from welfare eligibility.
Smith v. Vowell9
Action for relief based on state's failure to provide medically neces-
sary transportation for medicaid recipients, as required by federal
law and regulations.
Burrell v. Norton 10
Challenge to state regulation limiting emergency assistance to wel-
fare recipients in situations where loss was due to fire or flood.
Johnson v. Harder"
Attack on state regulation providing that Old Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance benefits received by a representative parent may
be included as income (to the extent that benefits exceed budgeted
needs of children) for purposes of determining parent's AFDC
eligibility.
Bethea v. Mason
12
Challenge to state rule denying AFDC-E (a program providing bene-
fits to the children of unemployed fathers) benefits to children whose
fathers were not eligible for unemployment compensation due to vol-
untary resignation from their jobs.
Cornelius v. Minter'
3
Action brought by an AFDC recipient and disability assistance recip-
ient against state officials charging failure to provide essential welfare
services with reasonable promptness.
Gooch v. Edelman 14
Challenge to statute imposing a charge upon all claims, demands, or
causes of action for injuries to applicants for or recipients of financial
aid from the state.
Dunbar v. Weinberger
15
Challenge to state regulation forbidding AFDC recipients participat-
ing in work incentive programs to disregard income derived from
those programs for AFDC purposes.
7. 503 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1974).
8. 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
9. 379 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Tex.), a2 7'd, 504 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. 381 F. Supp. 339 (D. Conn. 1974).
11. 383 F. Supp. 174 (D. Conn. 1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 876 (1976).
12. 384 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Md. 1974), afdsub nom. Bethea v. Batterton, 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
13. 395 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mass. 1974).
14. 398 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Il. 1974).
15. 412 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass. 1974).
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Grow v. Smith16
Challenge to state regulation denying or terminating AFDC benefits
for failure to provide information about absent parents or failure to
assist in support for fliation proceedings.
Begins v. Philbrook 17
Action assailing state regulation which denied welfare benefits to
families owning two operable motor vehicles, regardless of their
value.
Townsend v. Edelman1
8
Claim against state welfare policy denying AFDC benefits to other-
wise eligible eighteen-to twenty-one-year olds attending a college or
university rather than a technical or vocational school.
Linkenhoder v. Weinberger'9
Attack on state policy of including earnings from public service em-
ployment in computing AFDC benefits.
Garcia v. Silverman2
0
Objection to state administrative policy under which applicants for
relief were presumed unwilling to work if they had lost two jobs with-
out just cause within twelve months.
McLaughlin v. Wohlgemuth21
Challenge to state AFDC regulation which conclusively presumed
that income of a legally responsible relative was available to depen-
dents living in the same assistance unit.
Roe v. Ray2
2
Claim against state regulation which denied AFDC benefits to parent
solely because she had not reached the age of majority.
Roldan v. Minter23
Attack on state policy requiring documentary verification of age and
relationship of children for eligibility for AFDC benefits.
McGraw v. Berger24
Action against state welfare regulation authorizing the recoupment of
AFDC overpayments from earned income "disregard" where over-
payment not occasioned by the recipient's willful act or omissions.
White v. Beai25
Challenge to state regulation limiting distribution of eyeglasses under
the medical assistance program to those persons having eye diseases.
16. 511 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1975).
17. 513 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. 518 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1975).
19. 529 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1975).
20. 393 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
21. 398 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 535 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1976).
22. 407 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Iowa 1976), aft'd, 551 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1977).
23. 409 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 967 (1976).
24. 410 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 537 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1095 (1977).
25. 413 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd, 555 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1977).
19821
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Yearby V. Parham
26
Challenge to state administrative maximums for AFDC grants.
Gurley v. Wohlgemuth
27
Action against state AFDC regulation used to determine the number
of assistance units when two or more eligible AFDC families reside
together.
Robinson v. Rhodes
28
Claim that state welfare officials improperly denied poor-relief
payments.
Houston Welfare Rights Organization, Inc. v. Powell29
Attack on welfare department's policy of prorating recipients' shelter
and utility expenses when noneligible individuals lived with
recipients.
Davis v. Smith
30
Challenge to state policy providing for a deduction of a recipient's
advance allowance from subsequent AFDC grants when the allow-
ance was made to prevent a threatened utility shutoff caused by prior
nonpayment of bills.
Rush v. Smith
3
'
Action against income maintenance procedure authorizing termina-
tion of AFDC benefits to recipients failing to report for interviews
investigating fraudulent receipt of public assistance.
Yuan Jen Cuk v. Lackners
32
Challenge to statute which conditioned health and medical aid on
recipient's status as United States citizen, as five-year United States
resident, or as an applicant for United States citizenship.
Carey v. Quern33
Claim against policy distinguishing between employed and unem-
ployed general assistance recipients for purpose of determining both
the entitlements to clothing allowance and the procedure for ad-
ministering such allowance.
Swift v. Toia34
Attack on state's policy of prorating public assistance grants when an
individual with no legal obligation to support an AFDC family re-
sides with an AFDC family.
26. 415 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
27. 421 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
28. 424 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
29. 555 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. 431 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), ajrd, 607 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1978).
31. 437 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), vacatedon other grounds, 573 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.
1978).
32. 448 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
33. 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978).
34. 450 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'dsub nom. Swift v. Blum, 598 F.2d 312 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
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'Rickards v. Solomon 35
Challenge to Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's practice of
attributing spouse's income to the recipient to determine level of
medicaid benefits.
Doe v. Montana
36
Action against state and county management of AFDC program;
plaintiff alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.
Kimble v. Solomon3
7
Challenge to across-the-board reduction in medicaid benefits without
compliance with federal notice regulations. Retroactive benefits de-
nied, though benefits prospectively restored.
Metcalf v. Trainor38
Attack on state policy regarding shelter allowance paid to AFDC and
SSI recipients. Plaintiff was barred from receiving retroactive relief
for alleged wrongful deprivation of payments from State Supplement
Shelter Program.
Gilchrist v. Calfano39
Challenge to classifications by state in providing SSI benefits. Mere
participation by state in SSI program held not to be express waiver of
state's eleventh amendment immunity to retroactive relief. Retroac-
tive SSI benefits denied.
Thiboutot v. State40
Suit against reduction in AFDC benefits which reduction state based
on change in method of computation of available income.
Folsom v. Blum41
Challenge to state commissioner's practice of considering SSI and
Social Security income actually contributed toward shelter of AFDC
recipients. Plaintiff successfully brought action for declaratory and
injunctive relief, but court denied retroactive benefits under eleventh
amendment. The court, however, ordered defendant to inform plain-
tiff class of available administrative remedies for recoupment of ben-
efits wrongfully withheld.
Coalition For Basic Human Needs v. King
42
Equitable action demanding that state mail delinquent AFDC
checks. Owing to budgetary difficulties, Massachusetts was unable to
mail AFDC checks due in first half of month. Timely application for
injunctive relief in federal district court was erroneously denied.
Court of appeals reversed, but granted prospective relief only; since
half of the month had passed, the court applied its injunctive relief
only to checks to be mailed in second half of month. Initial checks
35. 457 F. Supp. 95 (D. Md. 1978).
36. 457 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1978).
37. 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).
38. 472 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
39. 473 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
40. 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979), aft'd, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
41. 87 F.R.D. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
42. 654 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981).
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erroneously withheld, for which district court failed to grant injunc-
tive relief, were classified as retroactive benefits.
B. Retroactive Relief Granted
Vargas v. Trainor
43
Challenge to procedure whereby state agency reduced or terminated
public assistance to Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD)
recipients.
Rationale for granting relief. Waiver found. State welfare official
openly represented that state had no eleventh amendment immunity
for retroactive payments.
Lyons v. Weinberger'
Complaint against reduction of AABD benefits where advance notice
and opportunity to be heard was not afforded.
Rationalefor granting relief T.R.O. construed as directing defendant
to pay money presently due.
Rhodes v. Weinberger
45
Attack on constitutionality of Social Security Act (SSA) provision
under which illegitimate children were denied survivors benefits be-
cause of unacknowledged or undetermined father.
Rationalefor granting relief T.R.O. construed as directing defendant
to pay money presently due.
Mackey v. Stanton
46
Challenge to welfare department practice of retaining court-ordered
child support payments as reimbursement for amounts already paid
to welfare recipient as AFDC.
Rationale for granting relief In light of state statute declaring county
welfare departments independent from state, eleventh amendment
did not apply.
Holley v. Lavine
47
Challenge to statute rendering illegal aliens ineligible for AFDC
benefits.
Rationale for granting relief. County was not an arm of the state for
eleventh amendment immunity purpose.
Harrington v. Blm
48
Challenge to procedures governing eligibility for and issuance of ex-
pedited food stamp benefits.
Rationale for granting relief. Since state would be reimbursed by the
federal government for retroactive benefits, eleventh amendment was
not a bar.
43. 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008 (1975).
44. 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. 388 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
46. 586 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 882 (1979).
47. 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
48. 483 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 639 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 32:364
RETROACTIVE RELIEF
Henkin v. South Dakota Department of Social Services49
Suit by mentally retarded plaintiff seeking private right of action
against state officials under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act for funding of tuition in a private facility
which provided treatment not available in state facilities.
Rationale for granting relief Relief which places burden on state
treasury is permissible if incidental to prospective injunctive relief.
Morrow V. BaeSsman
50
Suit under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act averring that plaintiff
had unlawfully been denied AFDC benefits and food stamps.
Rationalefor granting relief. County welfare department is not an
arm of the state, so eleventh amendment does not apply.
Markel v. Blum
51
Class action challenging state and county officials' policy classifying
New York State Higher Education Services Corporation (HESC)
loans as income for purposes of determining medicaid eligibility;
plaintiff sought declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief.
Rationalefor granting relief. Although the eleventh amendment bars
direct restitution by state commissioner in official capacity, the
county defendant did not enjoy such immunity and was required to
reimburse amounts which plaintiffs were unlawfully forced to pay for
medical treatment.
Calkins v. Blum
5 2
Class action challenging methods of determining eligibility for medi-
caid, brought by plaintiffs who were denied status as medically needy
for purposes of medicaid program; plaintiffs were then denied medi-
cal assistance.
Rationalefor granting relief' Restitution and monetary relief are not
barred by eleventh amendment in this instance since counties do not
fall within the "arm of the state" category; counties are payors of the
first instance of medicaid benefits.
Jamroz v. Blum
5 3
Class action challenging state and county social service commission-
ers' routine finding that nonexempt New York State HESC loans
were income under the AFDC program.
Rationalefor granting relief' Eleventh amendment is no bar to relief
based on the rationale of Markel v. Blum.
5 4
Willis v. Lascari
55
Challenge to county department of social services' reduction of food
stamp benefits based on new method of computing household in-
come; county had begun to include heat allowance in the
49. 498 F. Supp. 659 (D.S.D. 1980), vacated, 676 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1982).
50. 515 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
51. 509 F. Supp. 942 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
52. 511 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), a f'd, 675 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1982).
53. 509 F. Supp. 953 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
54. See supra note 51.
55. 499 F. Supp. 749 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
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computation.
Rationalefor granting relief Court cited Holley v. Lavine,56 and clas-
sified county department of social services as a local agency in-
dependent of the state, thus having no eleventh amendment
immunity.
Taylor v. Hill57
Equitable claim brought by pregnant women seeking preliminary in-
junction to halt state practice prohibiting unborn children from re-
ceiving AFDC benefits.
Rationalefor granting relief: In light of Edelman v. Jordan's ban on
retroactive relief, plaintiffs made adequate showing of the irreparable
harm which would result from continuance of state regulation with-
out injunctive relief.
Eder v. Beals"
Claim for injunctive relief to prevent state withdrawal from the eye-
glass program under Title XIX of Social Security Act until requisite
prewithdrawal notice requirements were met.
Rationalefor granting relief. Eleventh amendment presented no bar,
even though there would be costs incidental to the injunction and the
temporary effect of such injunction would be to give plaintiff past
benefits denied.
Mehler v. Blum
59
Class action for reimbursement of wrongfully withheld "medical
assistance benefits" from county, demanding that Quern notices60 be
sent to class members.
Rationale for granting relief. Eleventh amendment does not bar
award of damages against county, despite county's entitlement to re-
imbursement from the state. Plaintiff class members are entitled to
individual Quern notices except where both plaintiff and defendant
agree the cost outweighs any benefit to be derived. In such a case
alternate means of notice (e.g., posting or publication) may be used.
II. BACK PAY/RESTORATION OF STATUS
A. Back Pay/Restoration of Status Denied
Wilkerson v. Meskill61
Claim for overtime pay allegedly improperly withheld from state
troopers.
56. See supra note 47.
57. 377 F. Supp. 495 (W.D.N.C. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 529 F.2d 517 (4th
Cir. 1975).
58. 609 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1979).
59. No. 80 Civ. 3531 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1981).
60. See infra note 104.
61. 501 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Borror v. White62
Claim for recovery of back bonuses and payment for services ren-
dered as a prison barber brought by a prisoner in a state facility.
Roseman v. Hassler
6 3
Action brought by nontenured professor seeking reinstatement and
damages. State educational institution deemed an arm of the state
for eleventh amendment purposes.
Delafose v. Manson64
Action brought by prisoners seeking "hospital pay." Monies sought
deemed "back pay" and denied under Edelman v. Jordan as retroac-
tive relief.
Murgia v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Retirement65
Action brought by state policeman seeking reinstatement and back
pay following statutorily imposed retirement. District court permit-
ted reimbursement, but denied back pay; United States Supreme
Court reversed on issue of reinstatement.
Harkess V. Sweeny Independent School District
66
Action for back pay brought by school teachers whose contracts were
not renewed when staff was reduced.
Georgia Association of Educators v. Harris67
Action for payment of state university faculty salary increases legisla-
tively repealed after contract agreement.
Skehan v. Board of Trustees ofBloomsburg State College68
Action for back pay alleging improper dismissal of nontenured
faculty member.
Farr v. Chesney 
69
Action brought by clinical psychologist seeking back pay for wrong-
ful dismissal.
Atchison v. Nelson
70
Action brought by state employee seeking job reinstatement, dam-
ages, and back pay.
Jacobs v. College of W7lliam & Mary7 1
Action alleging sex discrimination in employment; plaintiff sought
back pay. Court held that eleventh amendment barred suit for back
pay to be distributed from public funds unless state consented to such
suit; fourteenth amendment only abrogates eleventh amendment im-
62. 377 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Va. 1974).
63. 382 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1974), af'dsub nom, Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of
Pa., 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976).
64. 385 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Conn. 1974).
65. 386 F. Supp. 179 (D. Mass. 1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
66. 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1975), modfedon other grounds, 554 F.2d 1353 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
67. 403 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
68. 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
69. 441 F. Supp. 127 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
70. 460 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Wyo. 1978).
71. 495 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Va. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 572 (1981).
1982]
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munity if Congress explicitly holds eleventh amendment applicable
whenever state is real party in interest. Each state- created entity is to
be considered on its own merits; if it lacks sufficient power to be in-
dependent, it receives eleventh amendment immunity as a state "alter
ego."
Weisbord v. Michigan State Universty72
Allegation of racial and sexual employment discrimination. Court
followed rationale of Jacobs v. College of William & Mary,73 adding
that congressional power to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity
under section five of fourteenth amendment must be "express." Court
held Congress had not abrogated eleventh amendment immunity of
states in section 1983 suits, but had done so in title VII suits.
Brook v. Thornburgh
74
Allegation of political affiliation discrimination. Former state em-
ployees sought back pay and reinstatement. Court held claim for
back pay against state or its officers in their official capacities was
barred by eleventh amendment; neither reinstatement and award of
back pay against state officers in their individual capacities nor pro-
spective injunctive relief was barred by eleventh amendment. Such
relief not barred even if it would cause state to make incidental ex-
penditures or would cause state officials to take official action.
Savage v. Pennsylvania
75
Section 1983 action for preliminary and permanent injunction and
back pay, charging violation of first amendment, brought by dis-
missed liquor control board examiner. Preliminary injunctive relief
granted, but claim for back pay barred by eleventh amendment.
In re Friendship Medical Center, Ltd.
76
Action brought in bankruptcy court by creditor for funds owed to
him for work rendered. Court held since funds were in possession of
state department of public aid, relief was barred because it amounted
to monetary relief from state treasury.
Nevels v. Hanlon
77
Action for back pay by state employee allegedly discharged without
due process. District court ordered commissioner of labor to restore
lost wages as restitution. Circuit court reversed based on Edelman.
B. Back Pay/Restoration of Status Granted
Gordenstein v. University of Delaware78
Action brought by former member of university faculty seeking rein-
statement and damages.
72. 495 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
73. 495 F. Supp. 183.
74. 497 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
75. 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1980).
76. 3 Bankr. 304 (N.D. II. 1980).
77. 656 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1981).
78. 381 F. Supp. 718 (D. Del. 1974).
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Rationale for granting relief. Eleventh amendment shield does not
apply; state treasury was insulated from an award in plaintiff's favor
since the university has fiscal autonomy.
Soni v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee79
Action for recovery of back pay brought by former professor when
his contract was not renewed.
Rationale for granting relief. Consent to be sued is inferred from
Tennessee Constitution.
Schiffv. Williams80
Allegation of infringement of first amendment rights brought by dis-
missed student editors of school newspaper who were seeking back
pay.
Rationalefor granting relief Source of back pay award was a fund of
student activity fees.
Burt v. Board of Trustees Edgeeld County School District8 l
Action brought by discharged teacher seeking back pay.
Rationale for granting relief School board deemed not an arm of
state for eleventh amendment purposes.
Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College
82
Action brought by discharged public junior college teacher seeking
back pay.
Rationalefor granting relief. Junior colleges are primarily local insti-
tutions, created by local authority and supported by local revenue.
Wright v. Houston Independent School District
83
Action for damages brought against school district for failing to re-
hire plaintiffs.
Rationale for granting relief' Eleventh amendment does not apply;
school district failed to adhere to a judicially mandated standard of
action.
Davis V. Grif7n-Spalding County, Georgia, Board ofEducation8 4
Action for back pay brought by former teacher challenging her
forced retirement at age sixty-five.
Rationale for granting relief. School board had no right to terminate
plaintiff's employment; the act was a nullity, and school board was
obligated to pay salary.
Campbell v. Gadsden County District SchoolBoard5
Action for back pay brought by former principal because of demo-
tion following unification of previously segregated school system.
79. 513 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
80. 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975).
81. 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).
82. 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
83. 393 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th
Cir. 1978).
84. 445 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
85. 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Rationale for granting relief. Florida school boards are not alter egos
of the state.
Savage v. Kibbee
8 6
Action alleging discriminatory employment practices brought by for-
mer university employee.
Rationale for granting relief Judgment paid by city university would
only have an ancillary effect on state treasury.
Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College
87
Action for damages brought by untenured public junior college in-
structor for nonrenewal of contract.
Rationale for granting relief. Junior college is an independent polit-
ical subdivision.
D'Iorio v. County of Delaware88
Action for back pay and reinstatement brought by county detective
for allegedly wrongful dismissal.
Rationale for granting relief: Back pay included in reinstatement is
essentially equitable in nature.
Miller v. Board of Education8 9
Action for back pay brought by school employee allegedly dis-
charged for political beliefs.
Rationale for granting relief- County or county agency is not entitled
to eleventh amendment immunity.
Berry v. Arthur9"
Action brought by professor alleging deprivation of standard wage
and rank promotions due to his exercise of free speech.
Rationale for granting relief. Upgrade in rank and salary deemed
permissible prospective relief, although it may involve future expend-
itures by state; eleventh amendment immunity not triggered in suit
against defendants in their individual capacities.
Eckerd v. Indian River School District9 1
Action brought by discharged tenured teacher seeking damages rep-
resenting last salary.
Rationale for granting relief. School board not deemed an arm of the
state for eleventh amendment purposes.
Pell v. Florida Department of Transportation92
Action for reinstatement and recovery of back pay brought by state
employee discharged due to absence while attending national guard
training.
Rationale for granting relief: Court held that suit for back wages was
86. 426 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
87. 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. 477 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa.), vacatedon other grounds, 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1978).
89. 450 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.W. Va. 1978).
90. 474 F. Supp. 427 (D.S.D. 1979).
91. 475 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Del. 1979).
92. 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
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proper since it is expressly allowed by the Veterans' Reemployment
Rights Act which abrogates states' eleventh amendment immunity.
Downing v. Williams
93
Action for reinstatement and recovery of back pay brought by dis-
charged state employee alleging violations of first amendment and
procedural due process rights.
Rationale for granting relieft Before a court finds an agency or indi-
vidual in his or her official capacity has eleventh amendment immu-
nity, it must examine his or her relationship to the state.
Hilis v. Stephen F Austin State Universiy
94
Action for reinstatement and recovery of back pay brought by former
professor claiming first amendment violation.
Rationale for granting relief. Action for back pay was not barred by
eleventh amendment because university was not an arm of the state;
university had own bonding authority with which it raised more than
fifty percent of its own budget and had power to make own employ-
ment decisions.
Morrow v. Sudler95
Action for recovery of back pay brought by former curator of state
historical society.
Rationale for granting relief. State historical society received both
state and private funding. Since the privately donated funds were
held by the state for the sole use of the society, the eleventh amend-
ment did not bar an award of back pay which came solely from pri-
vate donations.
III. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
A. Retroactive ReliefDenied
Drumright v. Padzieski96
Action for recovery of unemployment benefits which were termi-
nated without a hearing.
B. Retroactive Relief Granted
Jordan v. Fusari97
Action brought by female plaintiffs seeking unemployment benefits
denied during months surrounding childbirth pursuant to state
policy.
Rationale for granting relief. Settlement for back benefits deemed a
93. 624 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 645 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir.
1981).
94. 486 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.
1982).
95. 502 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Col. 1980).
96. 436 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
97. 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974).
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waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. Claim for attorneys fees
not barred by eleventh amendment in this context.
Bowen v. Hackett
98
Challenge to state laws providing children's dependency benefits to
unemployed males while requiring females to prove dependency to
satisfaction of the department of employment security.
Rationalefor granting relief Funds for this program were sufficiently
independent from the sovereign; eleventh amendment protection was
not triggered.
Jennings v. Illinois Office of Education99
Action under Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act for recovery of
back pay brought by state employee. Employee had left his position
to serve in the United States armed forces. Upon returning, he ap-
plied for reappointment, was turned down, and later filed suit for
recovery of pay lost during period prior to the state's offer of
reemployment.
Iationalefor granting relief: Eleventh amendment does not bar relief
sought by plaintiff. Congress passed Veteran's Reemployment Rights
Act pursuant to its war powers in article I of the Constitution and
thus acted to abrogate state's eleventh amendment immunity.
IV. NOTICE TO CLASS CASES
A. Relief Denied
Fanty v. Pennsylvania Department ofPublic Welfare l° °
Notice to plaintiff class members informing them that they were not
legally obligated to reimburse the state from their federal disability
benefits, and that, as a matter of state law, they may have had a cause
of action against the Department of Public Welfare.1 °'
Yuan len Cuk v. Lackner1
0 2
Notice to permanent resident aliens of their right to health and medi-
cal aid under California's medically indigent law (an unconstitu-
tional provision conditioning eligibility for benefits on United States
citizenship, status as applicant for citizenship, or five-year legal pres-
ence in United States). Notice denied would have apprised class
members of the state's wrongful denial of the retroactive benefits to
which such class members were entitled.
Rickards v. Solomon' 0
3
Notice to potential victims of state policy which attributed spouses'
income to medicaid recipients for purposes of determining benefits.
98. 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.I. 1975).
99. 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
100. 551 F.2d (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979).
101. This case was reversed by Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
102. 448 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
103. 457 F. Supp. 95 (N. Md. 1978).
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B. Relief Granted
Quern v. Jordan 104
Notice to plaintiff class members apprising them of available state
administrative procedures for determining eligibility for past benefits.
Lewis v. Shulimson'05
Notice to plaintiff class members who were denied medical assistance
in violation of district court order.
Siva v. VowellI 0
6
Explanatory notices to plaintiff class members who were denied
AFDC benefits because of "capable of light work" eligibility stan-
dard. Court rejected defendant's argument that administrative mail-
ing costs were barred by eleventh amendment. Notice informed
plaintiffs that regulations were changed and that, therefore, plaintiffs
had right to reapply for benefits.
Turner v. Walsh 107
Notice to plaintiffs whose AFDC and/or medicaid benefits were be-
ing discontinued, terminated, suspended, or reduced. Injunction was
issued prohibiting such reductions/terminations until plaintiffs re-
ceived notice.
Townsend v. QuernI0s
Notice of administrative procedures granted to individuals denied
AFDC benefits who had children eighteen to twenty-one years of age
attending college. Decision was based on the possibility of collecting
previously entitled benefits.
V. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
A. Retroactive Relief Denied
Beck v. California10 9
Action for damages for state's denial of coastal permit." 0
Fowler v. Department ofEducation11
Sex discrimination action for recovery of back pay. Court held elev-
enth amendment immunity applies to state officials acting in their
official capacities.
Stubbs v. Kline112
Action for damages alleging denial of free education for handicapped
child.
104. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
105. 534 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
106. 621 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. deniedsub nom, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
107. 435 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1977), a.Fdper euriam, 574 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1978).
108. 473 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
109. 479 F. Supp. 392 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
110. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text on lost property rights.
111. 472 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Va. 1978).
112. 463 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
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CrossroadsAcademy, Inc. v. Carballo 113
Action for damages and injunctive relief for alleged conspiracy to
deny plaintiff the right to participate as a provider under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act.
Crutcher v. Kentucky 
114
Action for race discrimination brought by state employee under sec-
tion 1983 against the state and the governor in his official capacity.
Court dismissed claim for retroactive relief against state and gover-
nor; state's participation in a program supported partially by federal
funds, could not by itself be construed as a waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity. Eleventh amendment barred retroactive
award against governor in his official capacity. Claim for prospective
injunctive relief against the governor was allowed to stand.
Miener v. Missouri
t 15
Action for monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief under Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act and the Civil Rights Act for defendant's
"past shifting" of its responsibility in providing education to the
handicapped. Court denied relief, although plaintiff phrased her
complaint in equitable terms. She sought "compensatory education"
for past infractions, rather than future compliance; court viewed this
as retroactive relief barred by the eleventh amendment.
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. Williamsport
Sanitary Authority' 1
6
Counterclaim alleging payment of EPA funds to state was contrary to
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Plaintiff was seeking recovery
of sums improperly paid to state. Although court agreed with coun-
terclaim's allegation, it denied retrospective relief under eleventh
amendment since such relief would have impacted on the state fisc.
Court found that state funds were protected by eleventh amendment;
state funds need not be derived from state tax revenues, but only
need be funds state can use as it desires. Court cited part test of
Bloomsburg v. Pennsylvania."1 7 Declaratory relief was granted.
B. Retroactive Relief Granted
Class v. Norton 11
8
Action brought by AFDC recipients seeking back benefits which
were denied due to state commissioner's failure to make eligibility
determination within federally mandated thirty-day period.
Rationalefor granting relief State welfare commissioner failed to ap-
peal a 1972 order in a timely fashion. This required payment of retro-
active benefits and doctrine of res judicata barred review.
113. 432 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
114. 495 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
115. 498 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mo. 1980) af'd, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982).
116. 497 F. Supp. 1173 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
117. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
118. 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Tullock v. Stat Highway Commission 1 19
Action for relocation assistance brought after state took over residen-
tial property to construct a highway.
Rationale for granting relief: State consented to suit and waived its
immunity by accepting responsibility for administering relocation
benefits under federal statutes and by legislating a statutory waiver of
immunity for non-tort suits.
Bloomsburg v. Pennsylvania Department ofEnvironmentalResources12 °
Action brought by municipal authorities alleging money claims
against Pennsylvania based on section 206(a) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.
Rationale for granting relif Plaintiffs were "citizens" for eleventh
amendment purposes. Eleventh amendment did not bar declaratory
or injunctive relief. Moreover, court refused to dismiss plaintiff's
claim for monetary relief. Court stated three-part test for award of
monetary relief; if funds are paid to state by federal government with
intent that they be paid to plaintiff, if state keeps such funds in a
"segregated account," and if state does not treat such funds as avail-
able for uses other than those for which they are granted, then mone-
tary relief may be granted.
Corpus v. Estell'21
Action to enforce inmates' right to legal assistance from one another.
State appealed district court decision awarding attorney's fees under
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
Rationalefor granting relief Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act was passed by Congress pursuant to its power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment; eleventh amendment was no bar.
Blake v. Kline I2
2
Claim for death benefits against Pennsylvania public schools' retire-
ment board brought in district court under diversity jurisdiction.
Case was dismissed as barred under the eleventh amendment; plain-
tiff appealed.
Rationale for granting relief. Court of appeals agreed that claim
barred by the eleventh amendment could not be brought in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction, but vacated and remanded. Court
held that prior to dismissal on eleventh amendment grounds a district
court must determine whether defendant agency and individual are
alter egos of the state, i.e., whether the damage award will come from
state treasury.
119. 507 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1974).
120. 496 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
121. 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980).
122. 612 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980) (see Urbano v. Board
of Managers of N.J. State Prison, 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948
(1970), a pre-Edelman case for criteria used by this court).
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VI. Loss OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Retroactive Relief Denied
Ligon v. Maryland123
Action for monetary and injunctive relief for devaluation of real
property caused when the property was rezoned from light industrial
to rural residential.
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. North Dakota 124
Action brought by common carrier seeking to recover rail freight un-
dercharges. North Dakota Mill and Elevator Association held to be
arm of state and suit was barred by eleventh amendment.
McAuliffe v. Carlson 125
Action for recovery of funds taken by state to cover expenses in-
curred in providing plaintiff with mental health services. Court held
that equitable restitution in this context was equivalent to retroactive
damages against the state's treasury.
Nasralah v. Barcelo 126
Inverse condemnation suit brought by property owner seeking to
compel commonwealth's acquisition of his property because zoning
change had allegedly prevented his making a profit from the land.
Plaintiff also sought punitive damages. Inverse condemnation and
damages held to be barred by eleventh amendment since common-
wealth funds would be used to effectuate such remedies. Common-
wealth, not the named official, was held to be the real party in
interest.
B. Retroactive Relief Granted
Vecchione v. Wholgemuth 127
Action brought by mental patients seeking to annul statute permit-
ting state to summarily seize and control property in satisfaction of
care and maintenance costs.
Rationale for granting relief: Pennsylvania deemed to have waived
eleventh amendment immunity since prior consent decree directly
bound the state.
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency128
Action for monetary and equitable relief from bi-state agency
brought by property owners alleging official action, which reduced
property values, constituted a taking in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
Rationale for granting relief' Such bi-state association was not im-
mune from suit under eleventh amendment in federal court.
123. 448 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1977).
124. 460 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.D. 1978).
125. 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
126. 465 F. Supp. 1273 (D.P.R. 1979).
127. 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
128. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
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VII. REIMBURSEMENT/AID SOUGHT
A. Retroactive Relief Denied
Pharmacists Society v. Department ofHealth & Social Services12 9
Action for monetary relief arising from state-imposed rate freeze on
reimbursement of pharmacists participating in medicaid program.
Shashoua v. Quern130
Action brought by doctor seeking reimbursement for medicaid bill-
ings. Court denied relief because plaintiff had named state official as
defendant for acts performed in his official capacity.
Moore v. Colautti13 1
Challenge to state welfare department's policy of obtaining reim-
bursement from individuals who received state-administered public
assistance pending award of federal SSI benefits. Reimbursement of
illegally obtained federal benefits by state was barred by eleventh
amendment.
Long v. Richardson 132
Action brought by former law students at state university for reim-
bursement of out-of-state tuition fees.
Jagnandon v. Giles 13 3
Action for restitution of excess tuition payments made to state uni-
versity by resident aliens under a statute requiring resident aliens to
pay nonresident tuition rates.
Mauclet v. Nyquist134
Challenge by resident aliens to statute requiring applicant for state
financial assistance to be or intend to be United States citizen; one
plaintiff sought damages for past monies withheld.
Stemple v. Board ofEducation 135
Action brought by parents of handicapped child seeking reimburse-
ment of tuition for special schooling of their child.
McAuifge v. Carlson 136
Action for reimbursement of social security funds taken to pay hospi-
talization costs at mental health facility; restitution of federal benefits
unlawfully seized by state barred by eleventh amendment.
Alabama Nursing Home Association v. Caifano 137
Action brought by nursing home association which contested validity
of payment rates used by state to reimburse nursing homes under
129. 79 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
130. 612 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1979)..
131. 483 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1979), a1f'd, 663 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980).
132. 525 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1975).
133. 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
134. 406 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), afd, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
135. 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979), af7'd, 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980), cer. denied,
450 U.S. 911 (1981).
136. 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
137. 433 F. Supp. 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd, 617 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1980).
1982]
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medicaid program. Plaintiffs sought only prospective, injunctive re-
lief, but court noted that restitutory, i.e., damage, relief was barred by
the eleventh amendment.
Fanty v. Pennsylvania Department ofPublic Welfare 138
Request for injunction brought by recipients of lump sum Social Se-
curity benefits. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin state welfare department
practice of collecting federal benefits to reimburse the department for
amounts granted under state welfare laws. District court denied res-
titution of federal benefits wrongfully withheld; circuit court con-
curred on this issue.
Riley v. Ambach 1
39
Action brought by parents seeking reimbursement for tuition costs
incurred when they placed their handicapped children in residential
schools in reliance on invalid regulation promulgated by state com-
missioner of education. Relief was barred by eleventh amendment.
Jones v. Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services140
Crossclaim brought by college against state for reimbursement for
cost of deaf student's interpreter. Student was suing college, state de-
partment of rehabilitation services, its director, and college president.
Crossclaim was barred by the eleventh amendment.
Stenson v. Blum 141
Challenge to state's termination of medicaid benefits without notice
or opportunity to be heard. Court restored benefits prospectively but
denied plaintiffs' claim for retroactive relief for out-of-pocket medi-
cal expenses incurred while medicaid benefits were denied.
Massachusetts HospitalAssociation, Inc. v. Harris 1
42
Challenge by hospital association to state's method of medicaid reim-
bursement, petitioning court to enjoin secretary of HEW from mak-
ing medicaid payments to state if state did not reimburse plaintiffs for
all past underpayments. Court held that this use of injunctive relief
would be the effective equivalent of ordering reimbursement, i.e., ret-
roactive relief, which is barred by the eleventh amendment. The
proper issue was whether relief sought was prospective or retrospec-
tive, not whether it was framed in equitable as opposed to monetary
terms.
Friendship Villa Clinton, Inc. v. Buck
14 3
Action brought by nursing home challenging method by which reim-
bursable expenses were calculated. Nursing home was seeking retro-
spective equitable relief and prospective relief. Retrospective relief,
even when framed in equitable terms, held barred in this context by
eleventh amendment. State's participation in medicaid program
138. 551 F.2d 2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1977).
139. 508 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
140. 504 F. Supp. 1244 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
141. 476 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aftd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 885 (1980).
142. 500 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Mass. 1980).
143. 512 F. Supp. 720 (D. Md. 1981).
Vol. 32:364
.ETRO.CTIVE RELIEF
and/or state's provision of a judicial remedy did not constitute state
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity in this case.
VIII. ADDENDUM
ADDITIONAL CASES
A. Retroactive Relief Denied
Sumrall v. Schweiker 144
Claim for refund of excessive rentals from state housing project.
United Carolina Bank v. Stephen F Austin State University
145
Action for back pay brought by professor who was illegally denied
tenure.
Cooney v. Miller
146
Action for reimbursement from medicaid program brought by
physician.
Pape v. Lermen 1
47
Claim for unemployment benefits.
Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut14
8
Action brought by Indian tribe seeking rents and profits as part of
claim for possession of tribal land held by the state.
B. Retroactive Relief Granted
Porter v. Schweiker
149
Challenge to policy regarding recoupment of AFDC overpayments.
Rationale for granting relief' Injunction construed as directing de-
fendant to pay money presently due.
Parks v. Pakovic1
50
Claim for tuition due for handicapped child at residential facility.
Rationalefor granting relief Education For All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act of 1975151 under which relief was sought was enacted by
Congress pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and abrogates state
immunity.
Department ofEducation ofHawaii v. Katherine D. 152
Claim for tuition assistance for handicapped child.
Rationalefor granting relief (a) State waived immunity by volunta-
rily commencing federal action to appeal administrative decision
awarding tuition; (b) Education For All Handicapped Children Act
144. No. 81-475-5 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 1981).
145. 685 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1982).
146. No. 78 C 3250 (N.D. I. Feb. 24, 1982).
147. 28 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. (CCH) 32,621 (W.D. Wisc. 1982).
148. 528 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1982).
149. 527 F. Supp. 150 (D. Minn. 1981).
150. 536 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
151. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1976).
152. 531 F. Supp. 517 (D. Hawaii 1982).
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of 1975 153 under which relief was sought by parents abrogates state's
eleventh amendment immunity.
International Union v. Indiana Employment Security Board
154
Claim for retroactive unemployment benefits.
Rationale for granting relief. Payment would not come from state
funds, but from federal funds and private employer contributions.
153. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61.
154. [1981 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 21,654 (S.D. Ill. 1981).
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